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THE NEW "FETAL PROTECTION": THE WRONG ANSWER
TO THE CRISIS OF INADEQUATE HEALTH CARE FOR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN
LINDA C. FENTIMANt
In 1999, Regina McKnight, a homeless, mentally retarded woman
who was pregnant and addicted to cocaine, was charged with murder
when her child was stillborn. The South Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed her murder conviction and upheld the twenty-year sentence im-
posed1
In 2002, a severely mentally disabled woman became pregnant after
being raped by the owner of the group home where she lived. The wife of
a Florida prosecutor sought to be appointed "guardian of the fetus" in
order to prevent the woman from taking prescription drugs necessary to
maintain her physical health and mental stability and to prevent the
woman from having an abortion. Ultimately, the Florida courts rejected
these efforts.2
In 2004, Melissa Rowland, a pregnant woman with a long history of
mental illness, sought assistance at a hospital because she noticed a de-
crease in fetal movements. Doctors recommended a Caesarean delivery,
but Rowland declined, and the hospital offered no other help. When one
of the twins she was carrying was stillborn, Rowland was charged with
murder, with prosecutors asserting that she had acted with depraved
indifference to the value of human life.3
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DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
In roughly two-thirds of the states, women who write advance direc-
tives to guide their medical care should they become incompetent may
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INTRODUCTION
The last few years have witnessed an astonishing array of intrusive
and punitive government actions against pregnant women. These gov-
ernment interventions, ranging from criminal prosecutions and fetal
"guardianship" proceedings to statutes safeguarding "the unborn" and
new "regulatory interpretations" of existing law, are touted as necessary
to protect fetuses from harm, particularly harm from their own mothers,
and are framed as a response to a new public health crisis. 5 While these
government actions vary in the extent to which they threaten women's
physical liberty and decision-making autonomy, 6 they share a common
view of pregnant women as vessels for the developing fetus, with both
the potential, and the obligation, to protect that fetus at all costs.
5. See Ziba Kashef, The Fetal Position: Federal and State Dollars Are Subsidizing a Boom
in Antiabortion 'Crisis Pregnancy Centers,' MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2003, available at
http://www.mothejones.com/news/outfront/2003/01/ma 218 01.html. Other government activities
support the position that embryos and fetuses are full human beings, as the Bush Administration has
funded so-called "Snowflake Adoptions" (the directed donation of embryos to infertile couples) and
fetal imaging technology for "pregnancy crisis centers," whose raison d'etre is to discourage women
from choosing abortions. See Elissa K. Zirinsky, Adoption's New Frontier, CBS News, July 28,
2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/28/national/printable712541 .shtml; Anna Mulrine, A
Home for Frozen Embryos, USNEwS.COM, Sept. 27, 2004, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
health/articles/040927/27babies.bl.htm (discussing the $1 million federal grant to two "embryo
adoption" organizations to promote public awareness of these programs). The Department of Health
and Human Services has funded so-called "crisis pregnancy centers" since 1996. See Kashefsupra;
see also The Abortion Access Project, Impeding the Right to Choose: Crisis Pregnancy Centers, and
sources cited therein (on file with Author); Informed Choice Act, S.755.1S, 109th Cong. § 2(a)
(providing for additional funding for ultrasound equipment to be used to provide pregnant women
with a visual image of the fetus).
6. One might distinguish, for example, between prosecuting a woman for homicide because
she used drugs while pregnant and a law that requires that pregnant women be told of the possibility
of fetal pain before having an abortion. My point is not that all government "fetal protection" initia-
tives are equivalent, but that they each diminish the ability of a competent adult to make choices
about her life and her body, and does so based upon the actor's status as a pregnant woman.
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Current "fetal protection ' 7 efforts pack a triple whammy: they un-
dermine women's health, limit women's ability to fully participate in the
economic life of the nation, and disproportionately affect the indigent
and racial minorities. First, the new "fetal protection" threatens to limit
women's ability to participate in the workforce and control their repro-
ductive capability by raising the specter of civil or criminal liability if
they engage in potentially risky activities before or during pregnancy.
Second, many "fetal protection" initiatives seek to redefine the fetus as a
person, with rights fully equal to those of a born human being, in a thinly
disguised effort to limit abortion access.8 Finally, efforts to constrain
women's actions for the benefit of their fetuses frequently reflect racial,
gender, and class stereotypes about how women in general, or certain
groups of women, do or should behave. 9 It does not appear coincidental
that poor women and women of color are the main targets of "fetal pro-
tection" efforts. ' 0
7. The term "fetal protection" was apparently first used by legal commentators in the early
1980's, referring to employers' policies that excluded fertile women from the workplace, or at least
better-paying jobs within the workplace. The ostensible purpose of these "fetal protection" policies
was to ensure that children born to their female employees would not be injured by their mothers'
on-the-job exposure to toxic chemicals, but the goal of protecting employers against tort liability was
also important. See, e.g., Wendy Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconcilia-
tion of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641
(1981). In the mid-1980s the use of the term was broadened to include state laws prohibiting the
experimentation on, and transfer of, embryos and fetuses, the fore-runner of today's controversy
over stem cell research. See, e.g., Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the
Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REv. 669 (1985). In the late 1980s, courts and commentators began to use
the term "fetal protection" to encompass tort actions and criminal prosecutions of women based on
their conduct during pregnancy, as well as broader questions about how to consider the interests of
women and their fetuses in the abortion context. See, e.g., George Annas, The Impact of Medical
Technology on the Pregnant Woman's Right to Privacy, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 213, 229 (1987); John
A. Robertson, Gestational Burdens and Fetal Status: Justifying Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED.
189, 202 (1987); Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Government Regulation of Pregnant
Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 187-89 (1989). What I call the "new 'fetal
protection"' is the increased range of government actions, beginning in the late 1990s and continuing
through the present, taken against, or about, pregnant women, encompassing health care access and
decisionmaking, civil commitment, and criminal and tort actions.
8. Julia L. Ernst, Laura Katzive, & Erica Smock, The Global Pattern of US. Initiative Cur-
tailing Women's Reproductive Rights: A Perspective on the Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 781 (2004); see also infra text accompanying notes 41-47, (discussing in detail
the debate surrounding Unborn Victims of Violence Act, Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004)).
9. Indeed, some of the most aggressive criminal prosecutions of pregnant women brought in
the name of fetal protection have been brought in the former slave states of Florida, Missouri, South
Carolina, and Texas; although these states are not the only locus of prosecution. See infra note 66;
see, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, A READER 127, 128-31 (Adrien Katherine
Wing ed., New York University Press 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies] (suggesting that the "devaluation of [black women] as mothers.., has its roots in
the unique experience of slavery"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 938, 939 (1997) [hereinafter Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood].
10. See Ira J. Chasnoff, The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and
Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1202,
1206 (1990) (observing that black women were ten times as likely as white women to be reported by
their physicians for using drugs, despite equal rates of drug use); LAURA E. G6MEZ, MISCONCEIVING
MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 118
(1997). Of course, one could observe that the poor and people of color are disproportionately repre-
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Strikingly, the new "fetal protection" crusades have failed utterly to
deliver more health care to poor children or women or to improve the
health status of at-risk children. Rather, they are potent symbolic ges-
tures, offering a quick fix to complex social, medical, and economic
problems. By blaming individual women for conduct which is often not
freely chosen," government avoids taking responsibility for its continu-
ing failure to meaningfully address the reality that many poor and low-
income Americans lack access to health care or acknowledge the special
problems faced by women who are victims of domestic violence, suffer-
ing from mental illness, and/or addicted to drugs and alcohol. 12 Effec-
tive health policy requires the provision of adequate heath care services
for all, including reproductive health care across the life span and tar-
geted services addressing our most vulnerable women and children.
This article will expand upon the feminist critique by focusing on
children's health as well as the health and liberty interests of their moth-
ers. In the first part of this article, I examine the legal and cultural un-
derpinnings of "fetal protection" and explore its current manifestations.
In the second part, I place "fetal protection" in a broader context, docu-
menting the ways in which American law currently promotes fetal life,
while simultaneously neglecting the lives and health of born children.
The third part of the article offers concrete recommendations about how
government, both state and federal, can actually achieve the goal of
bringing healthy children into the world and enabling them to live
healthy lives, paying particular attention to the problems of children who
are born into domestic violence and/or poverty and are therefore at high
risk for poor educational and health care outcomes. 13 If we are to truly
sented in the criminal justice system, in both the courts and prisons. See, e.g., William H. Edmon-
son, Note, A "New" No-Contact Rule: Proposing an Addition to the No-Contact Rule to Address
Questioning of Suspects After Unreasonable Charging Delays, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1773, 1785
(2005). However, this does not explain the extraordinary frequency and ferocity of criminal prose-
cutions against women of color, particularly when one considers that it is alcohol, not crack cocaine
(stereotypically connected with African-Americans), that is the drug most clearly shown to cause
long-term developmental harm. See infra notes 14-22 and discussion in accompanying text.
11. The theme of "choice" is frequently raised by proponents of "fetal protection," ignoring
the reality that for many poor women, the systemic lack of health care, education, and employment
denies them the ability to make optimal choices for themselves or their children. See, e.g., Erin
Nelson, Reconceiving Pregnancy: Expressive Choice and Legal Reasoning, 49 MCGILL L.J. 593,
623, 624 (2004).
12. There is a significant link between a woman's experiencing domestic violence (physical
or sexual abuse) as a child or an adult and her subsequent development of mental illness and/or
substance abuse problems. WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF PREGNANT
AND PARENTING WOMEN WITH SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS IN PHILADELPHIA 4, 6 (Sept. 2002),
available at http://www.womenslawproject.org/reports/PregnantparentingPVS.pdf, Lynn M.
Paltrow, Pregnancy, Domestic Violence, and the Law: The Interface of Medicine, Public Health, and
the Law: Governmental Responses to Pregnant Women Who Use Alcohol or Other Drugs, 8
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 461,477 (2005).
13. Poverty is a major contributor to poor birth outcomes and later childhood health problems.
See Charles Oberg, The Impact of Childhood Poverty on Health and Development, HEALTHY
GENERATIONS, May 2003, at 2-3, available at http://www.epi.umn.edu/mch/resources/
hg/hgchildpoverty.pdf; Jane D. McLeod & Michael J. Shanahan, Trajectories of Poverty and Chil-
dren's Mental Health, 37 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 207, 207 (1996).
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become a society in which "no child [is] left behind," we must imple-
ment a comprehensive public health strategy to promote women's and
children's health across the lifespan, not just during the few months in
which women are pregnant.
What's "New" About the "New Fetal Protection?"
At the outset, one might be tempted to ask, "What's all the fuss
about? Are these government actions so different from those taken be-
fore?" Women's use of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs during preg-
nancy has long been controversial,1 4 and there has been significant de-
bate over whether criminal prosecutions and involuntary civil commit-
ment are an appropriate or effective way to ensure that children are born
healthy and drug-free. 15
Virtually all observers agree that drug use, broadly defined, during
pregnancy is harmful to the newborn child, although there is disagree-
ment about the extent, and permanence, of the harm.' 6 Research shows
that 5-6% of women use illegal drugs during pregnancy, while 25% used
alcohol, and maternal alcohol use is the leading cause of mental retarda-
tion. 17 Some researchers have concluded that maternal cocaine use may
lead to subtle, long-lasting neurological deficits, including "the ability to
habituate or self-regulate" and small but statistically significant deficits
14. Currently, there is increasing attention paid to methamphetamine, which, like cocaine in
its day, is giving rise to media stories about the grave risks of in utero drug exposure for the long-
term development of children. See, e.g., Katie Zernike, A Drug Scourge Creates its Own Form of
Orphan, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2005, at Al; U.S. Warns of 'Global Meth Threat,' BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/4757179.stm. Others have criticized this media coverage
as sensational and poorly informed. See, e.g., Meth and Myth: Top Doctors, Scientists and Specialist
Warn Mass Media on "Meth Baby " Stories, July 29, 2005,
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/397/methandmyth.shtm; see also RYAN S. KING, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, THE NEXT BIG THING? METHAMPHETAMINE IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (June
2006) (asserting that the media have failed utterly to accurately predict the science and epidemiol-
ogical data surrounding methamphetamine addiction).
15. See, e.g., Sarah Childress, Justice: A New Controversy in the Fetal-Rights Wars,
NEWSWEEK, March 29, 2004, at 7; Lynn Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Abusers, Fetal Persons, and the
Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1008, 1009 (1999); Brian Maffly, 'Fetal Abuse'
Charges Give Rise to Debate; Mothers-to-Be Need Help, Not Fear, Critics Say, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE, Dec. 1, 1997, at DI; Wendy Chavkin, Vicki Breitbart, & Paul H. Wise, Finding Common
Ground: The Necessity of an Integrated Agenda for Women's and Children's Health, 22 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 262, 263 (1994) (arguing that choosing to reduce infant mortality, HIV transmission, and
drug exposure only by reducing harm to the fetus (and thus intervening through the body of the
pregnant woman) ignores data showing that provision of quality health care across a woman's life is
the best guarantee of ensuring healthy babies).
16. See, e.g., DAN STEINBERG & SHELLY GEHSHAN, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, STATES RESPONSES TO MATERNAL DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE: AN UPDATE (Jan.
2000), www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/matemalabuse.htm; JANET R. HANKN, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME PREVENTION
RESEARCH (Aug. 2002), http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh26-1/58-65.htm.
17. Addiction Medicine: Psychopathology of Pregnant Women with Alcohol and Drug De-
pendencies Examined, WOMEN'S HEALTH WEEKLY, August 23, 2001, at 8 [hereinafter Addiction
Medicine].
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in IQ and language ability, 8 but others have found that most infants ex-
posed in utero to cocaine "catch up to their peers in physical size and
health status by age 2."19 In contrast, maternal alcohol use during preg-
nancy is known to cause serious harm to children with significant in
utero exposure, and infants born to mothers who drank moderately while
pregnant may still experience deficits in IQ, learning, and attention.2°
Using tobacco during pregnancy poses risks similar in type to those of
21cocaine. Most recent research emphasizes the multiple factors leading
to poor birth outcomes, including maternal poverty, homelessness, a his-
tory of domestic violence, and lack of prenatal care, undermining the
argument that drug use, whether legal or illegal, is the primary cause of
children being born with deficits.22
Recent "fetal protection" efforts have been most aggressive in the
criminal arena. In an unprecedented use of criminal law's heaviest artil-
lery, prosecutors in two instances filed murder charges against women
who delivered stillborn infants, based, respectively, on the woman's drug
use while pregnant 23 or her refusal to have a Caesarean section. 24 The
result was a murder conviction in the first instance and a conviction for
felony child endangerment in the second.25 Women have also been
charged with other types of homicide26 and with child abuse or reckless
18. Steven J. Ondersma et al., Prenatal Drug Exposure and Social Policy: The Search for an
Appropriate Response, 5 CHILD MALTREATMENT 93, 95 (2000), available at http://cmx.sagepub.
com/cgi/reprint/5/2/93.
19. STEINBERG & GEHSHAN, supra note 16.
20. Ondersma et al., supra note 18, at 96.
21. N. Kistin, A. Handler, F. Davis, & C. Ferre, Cocaine and Cigarettes: a Comparison of
Risks, 10 PEDIATRIC PERINATAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 269 (1996) (noting that while children exposed to
cocaine in utero were more likely to have adverse birth outcomes than children whose pregnant
mothers consumed no drugs, children whose mothers used tobacco products while pregnant were at
risk for the same adverse outcomes as children whose mothers used cocaine, although the magnitude
of the risk was lower. "[G]iven the greater number of cigarette smokers than cocaine users in the
population... [there are likely to be more children harmed by their mothers' smoking than by their
mothers' cocaine use during pregnancy]").
22. See, e.g., Ondersma et al., supra note 18, at 95; Deborah A. Frank et al., Growth, Devel-
opment, and Behavior in Early Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure, 285 JAMA 1613,
1615 (2001). Because some women who use illegal drugs also abuse alcohol, researchers recognize
the need for comprehensive and intensive drug treatment programs that take into account the com-
plex needs of this population, which has high "[r]ates of homelessness, poverty, unemployment, and
prostitution ... [and] histories of emotional, physical, and sexual abuse." See Addiction Medicine,
supra note 17.
23. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171.
24. Mom in Caesarean Case Gets Probation, CHI. TRIB., April 30, 2004, at 18; see also Linda
Thomson, Mother is Charged in Stillbirth of a Twin, DESERET MORNING NEWS, March 12, 2004;
Linda Thomson, RowlandAirs Her Case on Cable TV, DESERET MORNING NEWS, May 13, 2004.
25. See McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171; Jacob Santini, Stillborn Twin Case Fades, Issues Stay,
THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, April 16, 2004, at B4. Criminal prosecutions against women who used
alcohol or other drugs while pregnant began in the late 1980's. See infra note 66. However, in only
one state, South Carolina, were these prosecutions and convictions ultimately sustained by the
courts. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778-79, 786 (S.C. 1997) (upholding conviction under
child endangerment statute for drug use during pregnancy because viable fetus is a "child" under the
statute); McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171.
26. State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 491 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Aiwohi, 123
P.3d 1210, 1210-11 (Haw. 2005).
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endangerment based on their alcohol and drug use while pregnant,27
relying on reports from physicians or newborn toxicology testing. Yet
the unanimous judgment of medical and public heath groups is that such
prosecutions will only drive a wedge between pregnant women and their
physicians, and render it less, not more, likely that the women will seek
appropriate pre- and post-natal care, including substance abuse treat-
ment.28
In addition to criminal prosecutions, in the last several years, a
breathtaking array of civil suits and statutory and regulatory initiatives
has sought to treat fetuses as entirely separate from the pregnant women
whose bodies sustain them. In 2002, the federal Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) issued regulations "clarify[ing] and ex-
pand[ing]" the statutory definition of "child" in the State Children's
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), a program which provides health
care to low-income children. 29  The regulations redefined "child," from
"an individual under 19 years of age''3° to "an individual under the age of
19 including the period from conception to birth. 31 Critics asserted that
this recasting of fetuses as "children" was both unnecessary and ineffec-
tive if, as HHS claimed, its goal was to provide pregnant women with
27. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 112-15 (discussing recent prosecutions
initiated in Maryland, Missouri, Texas, and Wyoming).
28. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85-86 (2001) (holding that public hospi-
tal's policy of testing pregnant women for drug use, developed in conjunction with local prosecutors
and police, and turning drug results over to authorities for criminal prosecution, did not come within
the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment). The Court observed that "an intrusion on.
. [a patient's expectation of privacy in regard to diagnostic medical tests] may have adverse conse-
quences because it may deter patients from receiving needed medical care." Id. at 78 n.14. In a
separate article, I will explore in greater depth the anti-deterrent impact of criminal prosecutions on
women seeking prenatal care and substance abuse treatment.
29. SCHIP was established in 1997 under Title XXI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1397aa-1397jj (2000), and gives states the opportunity to provide additional health insurance cover-
age to children whose parents are too "wealthy" to qualify for Medicaid. Medicaid, which was
enacted in 1965 and is authorized by Title XX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396v et
seq., provides health care insurance for the very poorest of American children. BARRY R. FURROW
ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 420-21 (4th ed. 2001). Both
Medicaid and SCHIP are federal/state partnerships, with the federal and state governments sharing in
both the financing and administration of the two programs. However, there are important differ-
ences. Medicaid is an entitlement program, in which all eligible persons must receive the same
benefits. SCHIP gives states much more flexibility in terms of the services that a particular state
may choose to provide. FURROW ET AL., supra, at 418-21, 438-39; see also Sara Rosenbaum, Anne
Markus, & Colleen Sonosky, Public Health Insurance Design for Children: The Evolution from
Medicaid to SCHIP, 1 1. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1, 3-12 (2004) (arguing that Medicaid, because it
provides a more comprehensive set of benefits, including Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic,
and Treatment (EPSDT) is a superior program). Children who receive Medicaid "are more likely
than uninsured children and as likely as privately insured children to receive well-child visits and to
visit the doctor in a given year. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
MEDICAID FACTS, EARLY AND PERIODIC SCREENING, DIAGNOSTIC, AND TREATMENT SERVICES
(Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MEDICAID FACTS], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Early-
and-Periodic-Screening-Diagnostic-and-Treatment-Services-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(c)(1) (2000).
31. 42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (2006).
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prenatal care.32 Instead, it appears that the real purpose of the regulation
was to establish the legal principle that fetuses are children, with all the
rights that accrue to that status.33
Government lawyers have also sought the involuntary civil com-
mitment of pregnant women, in order to impose "treatment" on the
women and their fetuses, 34 as well as court orders mandating Caesarean
sections. While the avowed goal of these actions is to ensure the birth
of healthy children, here too the consensus among medical professionals
is that such interventions are unjustified.36 More than thirty states' laws
permit civil commitment based on the use of alcohol and other drugs,
37
32. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, THE MEDICAID EXPANSIONS FOR PREGNANT
WOMEN AND CHILDREN (1995).
33. For example, in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986 Congress
expanded Medicaid to permit states to enroll all pregnant women with incomes up to 100% of the
Federal Poverty Level and adopted procedural changes that made enrollment easier, thus signifi-
cantly increasing the number of pregnant women eligible to receive pre- and post-natal care as a
means of ensuring better birth outcomes. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9401(b)(2), 100 Stat. 1874 (1986); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PRENATAL CARE: EARLY SUCCESS IN ENROLLING WOMEN MADE ELIGIBLE BY MEDICAID
EXPANSIONS 7 (February 1991), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d2lt9/143346.pdf. While these
changes in the Medicaid program were not totally effective in achieving the birth of healthier chil-
dren, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32, at 1-2, no one had ever suggested that
the result would be better if the fetuses were enrolled rather than the women in whose bodies they
were developing.
34. These include the case of State ex rel. Angela MW. v Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 732
(Wis. 1997) and Rebecca Coreau, a pregnant woman who belonged to a religious sect that did not
believe in Western medicine, who was confined in a "secure hospital facility for pregnant prison
inmates" by a Massachusetts juvenile court judge until she agreed to medical examination and treat-
ment. See Marilyn L. Miller, Note, Fetal Neglect and State Intervention: Preventing Another Attle-
boro Cult Baby Death, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L. J. 71, 71 (2001). These cases will be discussed in
more detail in Part I. C., infra.
35. News . .. Husband to Challenge Court Order in Lawsuit over Wife 's Refusal of Caesar-
ean Section, PENN. LAW WEEKLY, Jan. 26, 2004, at 9; Associated Press, New Questions about
Childbirth Rights, May 19, 2004, http://keyetv.com/health/health-story 140110423.html (discussing
the case of Amber Marlowe, who was the subject of an ex parte order to have a Caesarean section
because her fetus weighed 11 pounds, despite her having delivered 6 very large children previously).
36. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, POLICY H-420.969: LEGAL
INTERVENTIONS DURING PREGNANCY, available at http://www.ama-
assn.orglama/noindex/category/l 1760.html, (click "accept," search "420.969") (propounding a
general rule that "[j]udicial intervention is inappropriate when a woman has made an informed
refusal of a medical treatment designed to benefit her fetus" and specifically recognizing the need
for rehabilitative treatment for pregnant substance abusers); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS
AND GYNECOLOGY, Patient Choice in the Maternal-Fetal Relationship, in ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS
AND GYNECOLOGY (2d ed. 2004), available at
http://www.acog.org/fromhome/publications/ethics/ethics034.pdf (stating that "court-ordered
intervention against the wishes of a pregnant woman is rarely if ever acceptable"); American Acad-
emy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Fetal Therapy - Ethical Considerations, 103
PEDIATRICS 1061, 1062 (May 1999) (after discussing the range of medical interventions to promote
fetal health and the legal-ethical issues involved, concluding that "Under no circumstances should a
physician physically intervene [to insist on medical treatment] without the explicit consent of the
pregnant woman without judicial review .. ").
37. ALA. CODE. § 22-52-1.2 (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT. § 47.37.190 (2006); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-64-815 (2006); CAL. WEL & INST CODE § 3050 (Deering 2006); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1-1107 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-685 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2212 (2006);
D.C. CODE ANN. §7-1303.04 (LexisNexis 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.675 (LexisNexis 2006);
GA. CODE ANN. § 37-7-41 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334.60.2 (LexisNexis 2006); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 66-329 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-23-11-1 (LexisNexis 2006); IOWA CODE §
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and several states have recently enacted laws specifically authorizing the
civil commitment of pregnant women based on substance abuse. 38 Fur-
ther, a majority of states which authorize the use of advance medical
directives to govern the medical care of mentally incompetent individu-
als suspend the operation of these directives if the patient is pregnant.39
In June 2003, the wife of a Florida prosecutor sought to be ap-
pointed "guardian" of the fetus of a mentally disabled patient who lived
in a group home in order to prevent the woman from having an abor-
tion.40 Although the Florida courts ultimately rejected the suit, the case
became a cause cdl~bre in Florida.
In March 2004, Congress enacted the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act (the UVVA or Act),4 ' which made it a crime to injure or cause the
death of a fetus while committing another federal offense. 42 Both sup-
porters and opponents of the Act acknowledged the significant problem
of violence against pregnant women; 43 however, opponents objected to
the Act's solution. Rather than focusing on the injury suffered by the
pregnant woman herself and providing that a person who harms a preg-
nant woman who in the process injures or kills the fetus should receive
125.75 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29b54 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:54 (2006); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 35 (LexisNexis 2006); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-30-27 (2004); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 71-919 (LexisNexis 2006), see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-908 (LexisNexis
2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-8 (LexisNexis 2006);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-22 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.2-3 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
52-50 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-311 (2006); TEXAS HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
574.034 (Vernon 2006); VA. CODE ANN § 37.2-809 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.96A.140
(LexisNexis 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-2 (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. § 51.15 (2006);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110 (2006). Minnesota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota have involuntary
commitment laws specifically for pregnant women who use drugs. MINN. STAT. § 626.5561 (2006);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 5-410 (2005); see also OKL. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-546.5 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-20A-70 (2006).
38. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 48.205 (2006) (permitting the civil commitment of pregnant girls
and women, dubbed "The Cocaine Mom law"); see also Tom Kertscher, 'Cocaine Mom' Law In-
voked in Attempt to Detain Woman, Racine Case Thought to Be First Time Law is Used Without
Other Crime, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 1999, at 1.
39. See discussion infra Part I.D.
40. This attempt was rejected by the Florida District Court of Appeal in In re Guardianship of
J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), which held that under the Florida guardian-
ship statute, a guardian can be appointed only for a "person," and that fetuses were not "persons"
under Florida law. Id. at 538.
41. Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).
42. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2006). The Act enumerated a lengthy list of federal offenses,
including drive-by shootings in connection with drug offenses (18 U.S.C.A. § 36), violence at inter-
national airports (18 U.S.C.S. § 37), and assault on a federal officer or employee (18 U.S.C.A. §
111). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(b)(1).
43. H.R. REP. NO. 108-420, Pt. 1, at 4 n.2 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (citing Victoria Frey, Examin-
ing Homicide's Contribution to Pregnancy-Associated Deaths, 285 JAMA 1510 (200 1) (summariz-
ing the various studies)); Isabelle L. Horon & Diana Cheng, Enhanced Surveillance for Pregnancy-
Associated Mortality-Maryland, 1993-1998, 285 JAMA 1455 (2001); Linn H. Parsons & Margaret
A. Harper, Violent Maternal Deaths in North Carolina, 94 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 990, 991 (1999);
Dannenberg et al., Homicide and Other Injuries as Causes of Maternal Death in New York City,
1987 through 1991, 172 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 1557 (1995); Fildes et al., Trauma: The Leading
Cause of Maternal Mortality, 32 J. TRAUMA 643-45 (1992).
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an enhanced penalty for that harm,44 the UVVA makes such an attack or
injury a separate crime.45  To do so, the UVVA defines "unborn child"
broadly, as "a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of de-
velopment .... ,46 Like the SCHIP regulation, this language raises con-
cern that the statute's real goal is to limit women's ability to obtain an
abortion.47
Most recently, laws have been proposed which emphasize fetal
"personhood" in new ways. These include laws requiring women seek-
ing abortion to be told about fetal pain,48 to be informed of the need to
prepare a fetal death certificate, or to be given the opportunity to view a
sonogram or listen to the heartbeat of their fetus prior to deciding to have
an abortion. 49 Supporters of these statutes justify them as providing "in-
formed consent," but the statutes are unusual in mandating the substan-
tive details of what patients contemplating a medical procedure must be
told. In contrast, most American informed consent 50 law focuses on the
process of ensuring full communication between patients and their health
care providers rather than on the content of the physician-patient dia-
logue, 5' relying on the health care professional to determine what infor-
mation to convey to a particular patient based on her individual needs.
44. Senator Dianne Feinstein proposed an amendment to the Senate bill to accomplish this,
which was defeated by a vote of 50-49, largely along party lines. A similar amendment offered by
Representative Zoe Lofgren was also defeated in the House of Representatives, by a 229-186 vote.
Edward Epstein, Bill to Make Harming Fetus a Crime is Passed by Senate; Assailant of a Pregnant
Woman Could be Charged with 2 Separate Federal Offenses, S. F. CHRON., March 26, 2004, at Al;
see also H.R. REP. No. 108-420, Pt. 1, at 86.
45. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2006).
46. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(d). Under the law, "the term unborn child means a child in utero, and
the term "child in utero" or "child, who is in utero" means a member of the species homo sapiens, at
any stage of development, who is carried in the womb." See also 10 U.S.C.A. § 919a(d) (West
2006).
47. Senator Feinstein argued that the UVVA was a deliberate effort to undermine abortion
rights, by "'set[ting] ... the stage for a jurist to rule that a human being an any stage of development
deserves... rights under the law'... Epstein, supra note 46.
48. See S.51, 109th Cong. § 2902 (2005) (proposed by Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas, a
fierce abortion opponent); H.B. 238, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005). Both bills are discussed
infra in text accompanying notes 244-252.
49. See discussion infra in Section I.D. The way for these laws has been paved by federal
funding of fetal imaging machinery, through federal and state grants that are given to organizations
that promote "abstinence only" sex education. The so-called "pregnancy crisis centers" have been a
major beneficiary of such grants. Kashef, supra note 5; The Abortion Access Project, supra note 5.
50. Informed consent doctrine has roots in both the common law tort of battery and in negli-
gence. It protects a patient's interest in choosing when to be touched (a battery is an unconsented
touching and includes medical treatment which the patient did not agree to). See, e.g., Schloendorff
v. The Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). It also ensures that a patient
receives medical treatment from a physician who has explained to the patient those risks and benefits
of treatment that a reasonable patient would wish to know. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2001).
51. For example, some abortion statutes require that the pregnant woman be told certain
details about the fetus, such as its gestational age and its potential to survive outside the womb, and
be informed of the availability of medical assistance for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care,
as well as options for child support and adoption. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 40:1299.35.6
(2006); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN §171.012 (Vernon 2003); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992). In addition, there are other areas of health care in which state laws
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In sum, the mounting numbers of civil and criminal actions against
pregnant women, along with statutes and regulations equating fetuses
with born children, mean that the new "fetal protection" crusade can no
longer be ignored. These government initiatives are particularly disturb-
ing because their focus on the harm that could be caused by a woman's
behavior during pregnancy ignores the widespread failings of the Ameri-
can health care system, which does not promote women's and children's
health.
The United States falls far short of other developed countries in ob-
jective indicators of health status,5 2 and indeed, American infant mortal-
ity rates have risen in recent years. 53  Two-thirds of American infants
who die in their first year of life suffer from low birthweight, attributable
in part to their mothers' lack of prenatal care and long-standing health
problems, as well as to multiple births.5 4  One-eighth of American chil-
dren are born pre-term, at an estimated cost of $26 billion per year."
There are significant racial disparities in birth outcomes and other meas-
ures of children's health, which reflect major problems of health care
access, including the lack of a primary care physician and the lack of
health insurance.56 More than ten million American children have no
mandate that patients (usually women) be told of alternative medical or surgical options. See, e.g.,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1690 (West 2006) (sterilization); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.225
(West 2003) (sterilization); S.G. Nayfield et al., Statutory Requirements for Disclosure of Breast
Cancer Treatment Alternatives, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1202 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-
702 (West 2006) (childhood vaccination). Medical procedures that are less politically charged rarely
have such "informed consent" requirements.
52. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH PROGRAMS, PLANNING FOR
HEALTHY FAMILIES (June 2004), available at http://amchp.org/aboutamchp/publications/
familyplanning2004.pdf (noting that the United States ranks 29th in the world in infant mortality and
arguing that more attention should be devoted to encouraging family planning as a way of ensuring
good birth outcomes, as data show that when pregnancies are intended children are less likely to be
born premature and with health problems); Margaret A. Harper et al, Pregnancy-Related Death and
Health Care Services, 102 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 273, 273, 275, 276 (Aug. 2003), available
at http://www.greenjoumal.org/cgi/reprint/102/2/273 (noting that "[m]aternal mortality statistics for
the United States have shown little improvement for 2 decades, and 20 countries have lower rates,"
and concluding in a study of North Carolina maternal pregnancy deaths that lacking access to prena-
tal care made maternal death slightly more likely and having a Caesarean section made maternal
death nearly four times as likely). See also detailed discussion in Part I.B, infra.
53. T.J. Matthews, Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Infant Mortality- United States, 1995-2002,
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, June 10, 2005.
54. Id. See also ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, 2004 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, 34 (2005),
available at www.kidscount.org [hereinafter CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS COUNT]. Low birthweight
is also linked significantly to being born as a twin or other multiple births. Id. at 34; Tarun Jain et
al., Trends in Embryo-Transfer Practice and in Outcomes of the Use of Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology in the United States, 350 N. E. J. MED. 1639, 1640 (2004).
55. Press Release, Institute of Medicine, Preterm Births Cost U.S. $26 Billion a Year; Multid-
isciplinary Research Effort Needed to Prevent Early Births (July 13, 2006), available at
http://www8.nationalacademies.orgonpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordlD=11622 [hereinafter IOM
Report]. The Report defines "preterm" as any birth that occurs at less than 37 weeks of pregnancy (a
full-term pregnancy is 38-42 weeks post-conception) and notes that the rate of pre-term births has
risen 30% since 1981. Id.
56. IOM Report, supra note 55; Matthews, supra note 53 (noting significant racial disparities
in infant mortality rates within and across states); Kenneth E. Thorpe, Jennifer Flome & Peter Joski,
The Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage Among Pregnant Women, 1999 (Emory University
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health insurance at all, 57 even though at least 70% live in families where
at least one parent works full time.58
If the goal of government policymakers and prosecutors were actu-
ally to ensure that more children are born healthy and have the opportu-
nity to stay that way, the United States would adopt radically different
policies. In addition to the lack of health care access, two notable omis-
sions from the rhetoric of fetal protection are the harms posed to children
by assisted reproductive technology (ART), used largely by the middle
and upper classes,59 and the risk to all children posed by environmental
April 2001) (identifying disparities in health insurance coverage along racial, employment status,
and income lines) (paper prepared for the March of Dimes, on file with the author).
57. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID FACTS, ENROLLING
UNINSURED LOW-INCOME CHILDREN IN MEDICAID AND SCHIP (March 2005) (summarizing 2002
data), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2177-04.cfm [hereinafter KAISER, ENROLLING
CHILDREN]. In 2005, more than 12% of children under age 18 lacked health insurance for at least
part of the previous year. ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW
SURVEY, JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2005, 3 (Mar. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur2O603.pdf. "[U]ninsured but Medicaid-
eligible children are twice as likely as those enrolled in Medicaid to have an unmet medical need, to
have not seen a doctor, and to have substantial family out-of-pocket spending on health care."
KAISER, ENROLLING CHILDREN, supra.
58. Associated Press, Most Uninsured Children Have Parents with Jobs, Sept. 28, 2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendlystory/0,3566,216338,00.html.
59. What has been absent from the government initiatives described above are any efforts to
regulate the new assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) designed to address problems of infertil-
ity, which increase the risk of adverse birth outcomes, but which are used primarily by middle- and
upper- income Americans. See, e.g., Jain, supra note 54, at 1640 (noting the continuing high rate of
multiple births in the United States and their adverse consequences, but observing that the United
States, in contrast to many other countries, has not regulated ART practices, "in part because of the
basic belief that such decisions should be left to couples and their physicians"); Liza Mundy, A
Special Kind of Poverty: The Poor Get Used to Going Without, but Going Without a Baby is Hard to
Get Used to, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2003, at W08 (describing costs of infertility treatments and how
poor men .and women seek subsidized or alternative access to fertility treatment). People who use
ART are much more likely than the rest of the population to have twins or other multiple births,
which in turn dramatically increases the chances of having a low birthweight infant (one who weighs
less than 2500 grams, or about 5.5. pounds), from 6% to 57%. See CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS
COUNT, supra note 54, at 34. Low birth weight is a major contributor to infant mortality and devel-
opmental defects. Id. Yet even singleton births achieved through ART are at risk for harm. Jennifer
L. Rosato, The Children ofART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect Them
From Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 60, 62-66, 69-70, 77-80 (summarizing the data showing that
up to 10% of children born using ART suffer some adverse consequences and criticizing the regula-
tory hands-off position of states and the federal government); see also John A. Robertson, Procrea-
tive Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 9 (2004) (not-
ing that intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), which is used in nearly half of American in vitro
fertilization (IVF) treatments, may cause a higher incidence of rare birth defects as well as low birth
weight). But see Anja Pinborg et al., Neurological Sequelae in Twins Born After Assisted Concep-
tion: Controlled National Cohort Study, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 311 (July 15 2004) (finding no difference
in adverse birth outcomes between infants conceived through ICSI and IVF, but noting that children
born through ART methods have higher rates of stillbirths and neurological problems). See also
PHILIP G. PETERS, JR., How SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? OBLIGATIONS TO THE CHILDREN OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (2004). Similarly, the bioethics issues raised by particular uses of
IVF are generally ignored. Arlene Judith Klotzko, Medical Miracle or Medical Mischief?. The Saga
of the McCaughley Septuplets, Hastings Center Report 5 (May 1998); Susan M. Wolf, Jeffrey P.
Kahn, & John E. Wagner, Using Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Create a Stem Cell Donor:
Issues, Guidelines & Limits, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 331 (2003) (arguing that the combination
of IVF technology with preimplantation genetic diagnosis in order to produce a child who is a poten-
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hazards, including mercury in fish 60 and the forests 61 to pesticides 62 to
lead from older buildings and manufacturing.63 The United States has
also failed to promote fetal and children's health and development by
providing paid parenting leaves. 64 When compared to other developed
nations where universal health care and subsidized parenting leave are
the norm,65 the approach of the United States is both seriously out of step
and actively unhelpful in promoting childhood health.
tial organ donor for a sibling with a rare genetic disorder is so ethically questionable that it should
only take place under human subject research protocols which have been thoroughly reviewed by
institutional review boards). Only recently have suggestions been made that ART should be moni-
tored and regulated. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND
RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2-9 (March
2004), available at www.bioethics.gov. Due to the volatile politics evoked by discussions of fetal
and embryonic life, little regulation is likely to occur anytime soon. Rosato, supra, at 74, 75. In
July 2006 the Institute of Medicine issued a report noting the 30% increase in pre-term labor over
the last 25 years, and urging further study of the contribution of ART to this growth. IOM Report,
supra note 55.
60. Many species of fish pose risks to adults, children, and fetuses, primarily through expo-
sure to mercury and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB). "Children born to women exposed to high
levels of methylmercury [the organic form of mercury found naturally in the environment] during or
before pregnancy may face numerous health problems, including brain damage, mental retardation,
blindness, and seizures. Lower levels of methylmercury exposure in the womb have caused subtle
but irreversible deficits in learning ability." Jennifer Fisher Wilson, Balancing the Risks and Benefits
ofFish Consumption, 141 ANNALS INT. MED. 977, 978 (2004). PCBs are a probable carcinogen. In
addition, "[i]n children, PCB exposure in utero and from breast milk consumption has been linked
with neurodevelopmental delays, impaired cognition, immune problems, and alterations in male
reproductive organs." Id. at 979.
61. Anthony DePalma, Study of Songbirds Finds High Levels of Mercury, N.Y. TIMES, Jul.
25, 2006, at BI.
62. A number of widely-used pesticides are suspected of being endocrine disrupters, which
affect both male and female reproductive systems and increase the chances of infertility and other
reproductive harms. SHARON L. DROZDOWSKI & STEPHEN G. WHITTAKER, WASHINGTON STATE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES' SAFETY & HEALTH ASSESSMENT & RESEARCH FOR
PREVENTION PROGRAM, WORKPLACE HAZARDS TO REPRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: A
RESOURCE FOR WORKERS, EMPLOYERS, HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, AND HEALTH & SAFETY
PERSONNEL 48, 49 (Aug. 1999).
63. Lead poses risks to male and female workers, as well as their children. In men, lead
exposure leads to lowered sperm counts, abnormal sperm shapes, altered sperm transfer, and altered
hormone levels. The results can be sterility and infertility. In women, lead can cause miscarriages,
stillbirths, and infertility, as well as developmental disorders in children exposed in utero. NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE EFFECTS OF WORKPLACE HAZARDS ON
FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 2-3 (Feb. 1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/99-
104.html. Lead that workers bring home on their skin, hair, clothes, tool box or car can cause severe
lead poisoning for everyone who comes into contact with it, and can lead to neurobehavioral and
growth effects in a fetus. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE
EFFECTS OF WORKPLACE HAZARDS ON MALE REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH (1997),
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ malrepro.html.
64. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993), dis-
cussed infra in text accompanying notes 329-44, requires employers of more than fifty employees to
permit employees to take an unpaid leave for their own illness or a family member's birth, adoption,
or illness. However, in contrast to almost all developed countries, the United States does not man-
date paid leave. KURT H. DECKER, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE IN A NUTSHELL 9-14 (2000).
65. Sakiko Tanaka, Parental Leave and Child Health Across OECD Countries, 115 THE
ECON. J. F7, F8, F9 (Royal Economic Society 2005).
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A. Criminal Prosecutions
Criminal actions against pregnant women have risen sharply in the
last decade. Although women have been prosecuted for drug and alcohol
use during pregnancy in more than half the states since the 1970s, courts
have quashed prosecutions or overturned convictions in all but one state,
South Carolina.66 There the courts have upheld women's convictions for
homicide and child abuse based on their conduct during pregnancy.67
Virtually all the women who faced these criminal charges were living at
the very margins of society, suffering from poverty, substance abuse, and
often, mental disability.68 Frequently they were sexually abused as chil-
dren, and often they are current victims of domestic violence.69
In 1996, Deborah J.Z. was charged with attempted first-degree in-
tentional homicide70 and first-degree reckless injury,7' after she went
into labor while at a tavern and said that she would drink herself and her
fetus to death. 72 Her child was born with a high blood alcohol level and
physical features showing fetal alcohol effects. 73 Although the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court condemned her conduct, it barred criminal prosecu-
tion because under Wisconsin's "born alive" rule, a fetus was not a hu-
66. The first reported effort at prosecution was in 1977, when a California prosecutor indicted
Margaret Reyes on two counts of felony child endangering based on her heroin use while pregnant,
which allegedly caused her twin sons to be born addicted to heroin. The California Court of Appeal
issued a writ or prohibition, enjoining further prosecution of the case. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141
Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). A rash of prosecutions began in the late 1980s, beginning with
the 1987 prosecution of Pamela Rae Stewart, who had intercourse with her husband and used am-
phetamines, both against medical advice. See George Annas, The Impact of Medical Technology on
the Pregnant Woman's Right to Privacy, 13 AM J. L. & MED. 213, 229 (1987). Since then, at least 30
states have prosecuted women for manslaughter, child abuse or endangerment, or drug delivery to a
minor. See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING PREGNANT WOMEN FOR THEIR
BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY: AN APPROACH THAT UNDERMINES WOMEN'S HEALTH AND
CHILDREN'S INTERESTS 2 [hereinafter CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING PREGNANT
WOMEN], available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pubbppunishingwomen.pdf (listing
cases wherein women have been prosecuted for behavior during pregnancy).
67. See Whitier v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997) (upholding conviction under child
endangerment statute for drug use during pregnancy because viable fetus is a "child" under the
statute); see also State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (S.C. 2003) (upholding conviction for
homicide by child abuse).
68. See CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING PREGNANT WOMEN, supra note 66, at
2.
69. See WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12, at 7; see also Paltrow, supra note 12, at 477.
70. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (West 2005) ("[F]irst-degree intentional homicide" [provides
that:] "(a) ... whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or
another is guilty of a Class A felony.").
71. § 940.23 ("[R]eckless injury" [provides that:] "(a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily
harm to another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is
guilty of a Class D felony.").
72. Deborah J.Z. "allegedly told a nurse that 'if you don't keep me here, I'm just going to go
home and keep drinking and drink myself to death and I'm going to kill this thing because I don't
want it anyways."' Deborah J.Z. also expressed fear about the pain of giving birth and the baby's
race. State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 491 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
73. Deborah J.Z., 569 N.W.2d at 491. The baby's blood alcohol level at birth was 0.199%.
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man being.74 The court cited the ongoing debate over whether substance
abuse should be addressed through treatment or punishment, noting the
concern that threatening criminal prosecution could deter women from
seeking prenatal care.75 The court held that to permit prosecution of
Deborah Z. would mean that "a woman could risk criminal charges for
any perceived self-destructive behavior during her pregnancy that may
result in injuries to her unborn child. . . [including] smoking or abusing
legal medications . . . [or] 'the failure to secure adequate prenatal medi-
cal care and overzealous behavior, such as excessive exercising or diet-
ing."'
76
In 1999, Regina McKnight, a homeless African-American woman
with an IQ of 72 and an addiction to crack cocaine, delivered a stillborn
child.77 When she and the child tested positive for cocaine metabolites,
she was charged with homicide by child abuse. 78  McKnight was con-
victed and sentenced to twenty years in prison. 79  The South Carolina
Supreme Court upheld her conviction, rejecting McKnight's arguments
that there was insufficient evidence to show causation or mens rea.8 °
The court also rebuffed her argument that she was denied due process by
being prosecuted for homicide when the South Carolina legislature had
not enacted a statute declaring that a fetus was a child. The court relied
on its prior decisions upholding convictions for felony child abuse based
74. Id. at 496. Wisconsin law defines a "human being" as "one who has been born alive."
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.22 (16). The court explained its decision as required by the rule of strict
construction of penal laws and by deference to the legislature in a complex public policy area.
Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d at 494-95.
75. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d at 495. The court's concern is supported by a study of low-
income women who delivered their babies at an inner city hospital in Detroit, who stated their belief
that if Michigan adopted a law mandating that women whose babies tested positive for drugs would
be sent to jail, substance-abusing women would be less likely to seek prenatal care, drug testing, or
drug treatment. When the study's authors attempted to interview women in a state with a law that
threatened incarceration, all known drug users refused to participate in the study out of fear of self-
incrimination. See Marilyn L. Poland et al., Punishing Pregnant Drug Users: Enhancing the Flight
from Care, 31 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 199, 201-02 (1993).
76. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d at 494-95 (citing Hillman v. Georgia, 503 S.E.2d 610, 613
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998)).
77. Robyn E. Blummer, Moralists' New Target: Pregnant Women, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2003, at 7D; McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171, 173 (S.C. 2003).
78. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171, 173. Under title 16, article 3, section 85 of the South Caro-
lina Code, a person may be found guilty of "homicide by child abuse" if he "causes the death of a
child under the age of eleven while committing child abuse or neglect, and the death occurs under
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85
(2005).
79. See McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171. The court suspended the sentence upon service of
twelve years in prison.
80. The court rejected Ms. McKnight's argument that the evidence was insufficient to survive
her motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, finding that there was evidence of her "extreme indif-
ference to human life" based on her use of cocaine during pregnancy in light of South Carolina
precedents which upheld felony child abuse convictions based on a woman's drug use while preg-
nant, holding that both she and women in South Carolina generally were on ample notice that the use
of cocaine while pregnant causes fetal harm. The court also found sufficient evidence to send the
case to the jury on the causation question, despite evidence that in approximately 40% of stillbirths it
is impossible to make a medical judgment about the cause of death. Id. at 172, 73.
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on a woman's drug use while pregnant as providing sufficient notice, 8'
effectively ignoring her argument that her crime could not be homicide,
because a fetus cannot be treated as a child under criminal law unless the
legislature expressly declares it to be so. 82  The court also spurned
McKnight's argument that the homicide prosecution violated her right to
privacy and autonomy. 83 Further, the court rejected her argument that a
twenty-year prison term for the stillbirth of a child was unconstitutional
under the Eight Amendment, insisting that the proper comparison was to
84 8criminal abortion, rather than to other murders. 85
The McKnight decision was condemned around the nation, as un-
fairly singling out a poor, African-American woman for unprecedented
criminal punishment, while failing to address the underlying problems of
addiction and lack of health care access. Critics charged that threatening
drug-abusing pregnant women with criminal prosecution, rather than
providing them with social and economic support and effective drug re-
habilitation, would drive women away from treatment, out of fear that
they would lose their babies or be imprisoned.86
Similar concern was expressed when, in 2003, a Hawaii prosecutor
charged Tayshea Aiwohi with manslaughter based on her use of
methamphetamine while pregnant, which caused the death of her infant
two days after birth.87 Ms. Aiwohi was not charged until two years after
her child's death, when she had successfully completed a drug treatment
program. 88 Both the prosecutor and the trial judge spoke of the need to
hold her accountable and to send a message to prevent other mothers
from using drugs while pregnant. 89  The trial judge also rejected any
suggestion that Aiwohi's addiction might be a mitigating factor, declar-
ing that,
81. Id. at 176 (citing Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997)).
82. The maximum sentence for a woman who procures an abortion in South Carolina is two
years and the crime is a misdemeanor. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-41-80(b) (2002).
83. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 176-77.
84. Id. at 174, 177. The court declined to address McKnight's contention that the abortion
statute was applicable, saying that she had not preserved the issue for appellate review. Id. at 174.
85. Id. at 174, 177. The court compared McKnight's sentence to the sentence received by
other convicted murderers in South Carolina, and murderers of children in other states. Id.
86. See, e.g., Kirsten Schamberg, Prosecutors Targeting Pregnant Drug Users; Some Fear
Women Will Shun Treatment, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2003, at Cl; Patrik Jonsson, South Carolina Tests
the Bounds of a Fetus's Rights, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jun. 28, 2001, USA Section at 1.
87. See State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1210-13 (Haw. 2005).
88. See id.; see also State v. Aiwohi, FCCR03-1-0036 (Haw. Aug. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.courts.state.hi.us (use search function with the name "Aiwohi" and then use the hyper-
link for the case file FCCR03-1-0036).
89. See id. The trial judge ruled that "the State, with good reason, has served clear notice that
such conduct can and will result in serious felony charges brought where the child is born alive and
later dies or suffers injury due to knowing, intentional or reckless drug use." The prosecutor "hailed
the judge's remarks" finding the indictment was necessary "to get justice for the baby" and to hold
the mother accountable. Ken Kobayashi, Mother Gets Probation in Ice Death, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Aug. 26, 2004, at lB.
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[D]rug usage, including the use of crystal methamphetamine is a mat-
ter of choice and not an illness. Certainly it is a conscious choice to
obtain and use the drug initially and worse yet, while pregnant ....
If drug usage were an illness from the get go, we would today be in
[a] medical center with a physician present in a diagnosis, treatment
mode.
90
Ms. Aiwohi pleaded no contest in order to appeal the denial of her mo-
tion to dismiss, and received a twenty-year prison sentence, which was
suspended on condition that she comply with the terms of probation for
the next ten years. 91 The Supreme Court of Hawaii overturned the con-
viction, holding that one of the elements of manslaughter was the atten-
dant circumstance that the victim be a person at the time of the defen-
dant's conduct.
92
Yet even after McKnight and Aiwohi, few observers were prepared
for the 2004 prosecution of Melissa Rowland for capital murder in Utah
after she declined to have a recommended Caesarean section and her son
was stillborn. 93 Like Ms. McKnight, Ms. Rowland was a vulnerable
woman with few resources. Her own mother died shortly after birth, and
Melissa Rowland had a history of serious mental illness dating from
childhood, as well as substance abuse problems. 94 Ms. Rowland moved
to Utah to deliver her children at the request of the adoption agency that
was handling their adoption because Utah's loose adoption laws made
adoption easier. 95 In Utah, she lived on Social Security disability pay-
ments and a $100 weekly stipend from the adoption agency; she also
used cocaine and tobacco. 96 Ms. Rowland sought help at three hospitals
because she could not feel fetal movements, but rejected their advice to
have a Caesarean section (C-section). 97 None of the hospitals sought a
court order requiring a C-section or made any other effort to provide Ms.
Rowland with medical treatment.98 However, after Ms. Rowland deliv-
ered a stillborn son and a living daughter, she was arrested and charged
with murder. 99 After spending more than three months in jail, Rowland
90. See State v. Aiwohi, FCCR03-1-0036 (Haw. Aug. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.courts.state.hi.us (use search function with the name "Aiwohi" and then use the hyper-
link for the case file FCCR03-1-0036).
91. See id.
92. See State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1223 (Haw. 2005).
93. Linda Thomson & Pat Reavy, Rowland's Out of Jail, Heading to Indiana, DESERET
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 30, 2004.
94. See id.
95. See Katha Pollitt, Pregnant and Dangerous, 278 (#16) THE NATION 9, Apr. 26,2004.
96. See id.; see also Pamela Manson, Mother is Charged in Stillborn Son's Death..., SALT
LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 12, 2004, at Al.
97. Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Manson, supra note 96. Prosecutors charged
that she refused to have a Caesarean section because of cosmetic concerns that the operation would
disfigure her. See id But Rowland stated that she never would have said that because she had
already delivered two children by Caesarean. See Pollitt, supra note 95.
98. See, e.g., Thompson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Manson, supra note 96.
99. See Manson, supra note 96.
[Vol. 84:2
THE NEW "FETAL PROTECTION"
pleaded guilty to two counts of felony child endangerment based on her
drug use during pregnancy pursuant to a plea bargain. 100
The Rowland case aroused a storm of controversy.101 Prosecutors
argued that Rowland's failure to undergo a C-section when she was
warned that the fetuses might be harmed by a delay in their birth was a
culpable omission, demonstrating the "depraved indifference to human
life" necessary for a murder charge. 10 2  The indictment was expressly
predicated on a theory of maternal "selfishness," as prosecutors argued
that Ms. Rowland had refused the surgical procedure solely out of van-
ity. 0 3 The prosecutors suggested, contrary to established tort law princi-
ples of informed consent,'04 that Ms. Rowland did not have a right to
decline medical treatment, but was required to "choose among alternative
treatments available," rather than electing the option of no treatment.' 
05
Virtually all other observers condemned the prosecution as unwar-
ranted and legally unsound. 10 6 In part, they argued that it was improper
and dangerous to subject anyone to the risk of criminal prosecution based
on a decision to forego a potentially dangerous surgical procedure, par-
ticularly when there had been no effort to seek a court order mandating
medical treatment. 107 Commentators also asserted that criminal prosecu-
tion was not the way to handle potentially risky pregnancies, as it would
drive vulnerable women away from medical treatment due to fear that
they would face criminal charges if they admitted to having a drug or
mental health problem. 108 Similarly, vulnerable women may fear crimi-
nal charges if they underwent drug testing while receiving prenatal care
or delivering the baby. 109 Further, some writers cautioned that prosecut-
ing pregnant women under these circumstances would lead to a slippery
100. See Santini, supra note 25; see also Doug Smith & Linda Thomson, Rowland in New
Trouble, DESERET MORNING NEWS May 27, 2004. Ms. Rowland was sentenced to two concurrent
five year prison terms, with sentence suspended while on "good behavior" probation for eighteen
months, requiring her to complete mental health and substance abuse treatment as well as a "parent-
ing skills" course. See id. Ms. Rowland went directly from jail to a rehabilitation facility in Indiana,
but left it after a month. See id
101. See Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93.
102. Thomson, Rowland Case Is Called 'Political,' DESERET MORNING NEWS Mar. 13, 2004.
103. Associated Press, Mother Accused of Murder of Unborn Child Pleads Not Guilty, Mar.
15, 2004, available at http://www.signonsandiego.con/news/nation/20040315-1529-wst-mother
charged.html.
104. See discussion infra in Part II. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5 codifies the common law of
informed consent, although it presumes that "when a person submits to health care rendered by a
health care provider ... that what the health care provider did was [ ]expressly or impliedly author-
ized" by the patient. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5(1) (2006). However, patients may still have a
cause of action for battery without meeting the requirements of § 78-14-5 if they allege that they did
not consent at all to medical treatment. Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
105. Linda Thomson, Mother Is Charged in Stillbirth of a Twin, DESERET MORNING NEWS
(Salt Lake City, Utah), Mar. 12, 2004.
106. See, e.g., Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; Matt Canham, Proposed Law Targets Preg-
nant Drug Users..., SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Apr. 10, 2004, at A1.
107. See Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Manson, supra note 96.
108. See, e.g., Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Canham, supra note 106.
109. See, e.g., Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Canharn, supra note 106.
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slope: there was no principled way to distinguish the prosecution in that
case from prosecution of pregnant women who smoke or who do not
follow their physicians' recommendations about healthy eating. 1° Fi-
nally, observers again noted the problem of selective prosecution, since
almost all those facing such criminal charges are poor and women of
color. "'
Nonetheless, prosecutors continue to bring criminal charges against
women who have used drugs while pregnant, most recently in Mary-
land, 112 Missouri, t13 Texas, 1 4 and Wyoming."15 It appears that prosecu-
tors are more interested in scoring points with the public or in pushing
the legislature to expand criminal sanctions against pregnant women who
use drugs than in addressing the underlying causes of substance abuse.
For example, a Wyoming prosecutor who lost his case declared, "We
110. Associated Press, Arrest in C-Section Case Alarms Women's Groups, THE HOLLAND
SENTINEL, available at http://hollandsentinel.com (use search function and type in name of article).
111. See, e.g., Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, supra note 9, at 938; Chasnoff et al.,
supra note 10, at 1206.
112. See generally Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. 2006). The Maryland Court of Ap-
peals has recently invalidated the prosecution of two women for reckless endangerment based on
their use of cocaine while pregnant. Id.
113. A Missouri prosecutor charged Keila Lewis with first degree felony child endangerment,
based on her newborn baby's positive test for marijuana and Lewis' admission that she smoked
marijuana once while pregnant. Brief of Amici Curiae in State v. Lewis, Case 03CR 113048, Chari-
ton County, Missouri Circuit Ct. (on file with author) Ms. Lewis was charged with violating section
568.045, which provides inter alia that "A person commits the crime of endangering the welfare of a
child in the first degree if... [t]he person knowingly acts in a manner that creates a substantial risk
to the life, body, or health of a child less than seventeen years old .. " Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.045
(West 2006). The case was dismissed in 2005 because the infant's toxicology test was inadmissible
under Missouri law. Personal communications with Jane Aiken, Professor, Washington University
School of Law, March 7, 2005, and Jenean Thompson, Counsel for Keila Lewis, June 21, 2005.
114. In September 2003, an Amarillo, Texas prosecutor invoked a newly enacted state law
when she asked local physicians to report all women who used illegal drugs while pregnant, so that
they could be prosecuted for child abuse. The new law, redefined the term "individual" in certain
statutes to mean "a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at very stage of gestation
from fertilization until birth." S. 319, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003). The law also redefined
death to "include... for an individual who is an unborn child, the failure to be born alive." Tex.
Atty. Gen. Opinion No. GA-0291, January 5, 2005, available at http://
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/GA/GA0291.pdf. See Letter from Rebecca King, 4 7 'h District
Attorney to all Physicians Practicing in Potter County, Texas (Sept. 22, 2003) (on file with author).
The prosecutor charged at least eighteen women with crimes before the Texas Attorney General
issued an Opinion concluding that the new law neither authorized prosecution for maternal drug use
under the Controlled Substances Act nor required physicians to report such drug use. News from
Lynn Paltrow, Executive Director of National Advocates for Pregnant Women,
http://realcostofprisons.org/blog. The convictions of two women for delivery of a controlled sub-
stance to a fetus were overturned by the Texas Court of Appeals, on the ground that the prosecution
did not show that the fetus possessed the drug as required by Texas law. Ward v. State, 188 S.W.3d
874 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) and Rhonda Tulane Smith v. State, No. 07-04-0490, 2006 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2370 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2006) (unpublished opinion).
115. See Associated Press, Judge Drops 'Meth Baby' Charge, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Sept.
29, 2005, available at http://www.casperstartribune.com (use search function). In 2004, a Wyoming
prosecutor charged Michelle Foust with causing a child to ingest methamiphetamine based on blood
tests of Foust and her newborn child. See id The case was dismissed on the ground that the law
encompassed conduct taken in regard to a "'child,' ... not a 'fetus' or 'unborn child."' Id.; see also
Associated Press, Woman Charged with Using Meth While Pregnant Arrested Again, May 2, 2005,
available at http://www.billingsgazette.com (use search function).
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stuck our toe in the water on this thing .... People need to understand
there's a big hole in the law that needs to be filled." 116 It has been left to
the judiciary to restrain overzealous prosecutors, through the application
of the fundamental principle that legislative intent to criminalize certain
behavior must be clear, and in recognition of the multiple policy consid-
erations that argue against punishing pregnant women rather than offer-
ing them treatment. 117
B. New Criminal Statutes.: Changing the Born-Alive Rule
While the prosecutions of pregnant women for murder in McKnight
and Rowland made headlines, the trend toward third party criminal liabil-
ity for causing the death of a fetus has been underway for more than
thirty years. 118 This change has been accomplished primarily by legisla-
tive action, as courts have been reluctant to overturn the common law
"born-alive rule" without explicit legislative authorization. 119 Under the
"born-alive rule," the fetus was not seen as a legal person, separate from
its mother, and a homicide prosecution could not be brought. 120 Criminal
116. Associated Press, Judge Drops 'Meth Baby' Charge, supra note 115.
117. See Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. 2006). As the Maryland Court of Appeals ex-
plained in State v. Kilmon, to accept the prosecutor's argument to construe the reckless endanger-
ment statute to apply to pregnant women who used drugs could mean the criminalization of:
[N]ot just the ingestion of unlawful controlled substances but a whole host of intentional
and conceivably reckless activity... [including] everything from becoming (or remain-
ing) pregnant with knowledge that the child likely will have a genetic disorder that may
cause serious disability or death ... to smoking, to not maintaining a proper and suffi-
cient diet ... to exercising too much or too little ....
Id. at 311-12. The court also noted that the Maryland Legislature had considered but a penal ap-
proach to pregnant women's drug use, choosing instead to provide drug treatment for pregnant
women and to consider a woman's drug use while pregnant, if she subsequently refused to enter a
treatment program, as evidence supporting the termination of her parental rights. Id. at 312.
118. See generally Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
119. See, e.g., id. The "born alive" rule is of very long standing. See id. Lord Coke is fre-
quently cited for his articulation of the rule:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in her wombe, or
if a man beat her, whereby the child dyeth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead
childe, this is great misprision, and no murder; but if he childe be born alive and dyeth of
the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable
creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive.
State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599, 601 (Ohio 1971) (citing 3 Coke, Institutes 58 [1648]). Coke
was followed by other British jurists, including Blackstone, Hale, Hawkins, and Sir James Stephen,
and the rule passed into American common law. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 620.
120. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W. 3d 654, 657 (Ky. 2004). In part this was
due to difficulties in proof, because in the case of a stillbirth it could not be established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the fetus had been alive when injured or that the defendant's conduct was the
proximate cause of death. See id. (citing Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The
Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. L. REv. 563, 575 (1987)). At the same
time, the born alive rule reflected the essential unity of the pregnant woman and her fetus, and the
latter's absolute dependence on her for existence. Cf Dobson v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753, 1
95-96 (Can.) (explaining, in the context of deciding not to impose maternal tort liability on the basis
of prenatal harm, that "a pregnant woman cannot have a duty of care to her own foetus, which is at
law but a part of herself .... [T]he physical unity of pregnant woman and foetus means that the
imposition of a duty of care would amount to a profound compromise of her privacy and auton-
omy.").
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statutes were interpreted in light of that rule, unless the statute specifi-
cally included fetuses within the class of victims. 121
In the last few years, there has been an expanded push to character-
ize the harm caused by battering a pregnant woman solely as harm to the
fetus, effectively erasing the woman herself. 122  New criminal laws di-
rected at fetal harm ignore the psychic injuries imposed on the woman by
such attacks. These include the fear of future domestic violence and
subjugation by an intimate partner, the loss of self-determination, and the
harm to the woman's interest in carrying her pregnancy to term. 123 At
least nineteen states have enacted statutes authorizing a homicide prose-
cution for causing the death of a fetus, 124 and Congress accomplished
this via the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. 125 Several states have en-
acted separate feticide statutes or other statutes focusing on fetal harm. 26
Some state courts have achieved the same result through judicial inter-
pretation, rejecting the common law "born alive" rule as outmoded.
127
However, with the exception of South Carolina, each court has been
121. See, e.g., Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d at 600-02. The same approach was taken with tort suits
for prenatal injury and wrongful death, and inheritance proceedings. See id (citing Robbins v. State,
8 Ohio St. 131 (1857)); see also Keeler, 470 P.2d at 627 (citing State v. McKee, 1 Add. 1 (Pa.
1797)); see also Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909, 910 (Ga. 1951) (citing Black-
stone's Commentary on the Laws of England and the common law rule that an infant "in the
mother's womb . . . is capable of having a legacy ... made to it."). See generally Remy v. Mac-
Donald, 801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 2004) (discussing common law cases permitting a born child to sue
a third party for causing prenatal injuries and the Massachusetts wrongful death statute's applicabil-
ity to a viable stillborn fetus).
122. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 IND.
L. J. 667, 694-97 (2006).
123. Id. at 669, 677-85.
124. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1103(A)(5) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2006);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.071, 782.09 (West 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2, 5/9-2.1, 5/9-
3.2 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266, 609.2661-65 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
3-37 (West 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.205, 565.024, 565.020 (West 2006); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.210 (West 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE §§12.1-01-
04, 17.1-01-04 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01-2903.07, 2903.09 (West 2006); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2601-09 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-16-1, 22-16-15, 22-16-20,
22-16-41 (2006) (including definitions: 22-1-2(31), 22-1-(50A)); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-201,
39-13-202, 39-13-210 (amended 2006), 39-13-211, 39-13-213 to 215 (West 2006); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-201 (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.32.060(l)(b) (West 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.75, 940.01-.02, 940.05-.06, 940.08-.10
(West 2006).
125. Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).
126. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-80, 40-6-393.1, 52-7-12.3 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
42-1-6 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8 (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3440 (West
2006); H. 108, 2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:32.5-32.8
(2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 631:1-631:2 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (West 2006);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-18.2 (West 2006). In Virginia, killing a pregnant woman with the intent
to terminate her pregnancy is capital murder. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (West 2006).
127. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004) (holding that born alive
rule should be eliminated through a reinterpretation of the term "human being"); Hughes v. State,
868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (holding in a vehicular manslaughter case that born alive rule
should be abandoned, but only prospectively); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1326-27
(Mass. 1984) (holding that a viable fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the vehicular homicide
statute, but applying it prospectively only "in order to ensure fairness to the defendant and ...
[others] who did not have the benefit of the warning provided by our construction").
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careful to apply its rule prospectively only, recognizing the due process
"legality" problem that would arise if a court were to change the com-
mon law and apply it to the case before it. 1
28
C. Regulatory Redefinition: SCHIP-Turning the Fetus into a Child
At the same time that criminal initiatives which treat the fetus as a
legally separate person have increased, the Bush Administration has
adopted regulatory policies with the same goal. In 2002, the Department
of Health and Services (HHS) promulgated a regulation purporting to
"clarify and expand" 129 the definition of "child" under the State Child
Health Insurance Program 30 by redefining "child" from "an individual
under 19 years of age"131 to "an individual under the age of 19 including
the period from conception to birth." 132 The Bush Administration offered
two justifications for this change. The first was to promote the birth of
healthy children by expanding government coverage of prenatal care,
fetal surgery, and other medical interventions which it asserted would
provide "continuity of care," benefit children after birth, and ultimately
save the SCHIP program money. 33 The second goal was to maximize
states' "regulatory flexibility,"' 134 permitting them to cover "unborn chil-
dren," including those of immigrant women, who would otherwise be
excluded from federal health care programs under the provisions of the
128. See, e.g., Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 654; see also Hughes, 868 P.2d at 730; see also Cass,
467 N.E.2d at 1326-27.
129. State Children's Health Insurance Program; Eligibility for Prenatal Care for Unborn
Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 9936, 9937 (proposed Mar. 5, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 457) [here-
inafter SCHIP Proposed Rule].
130. The State Children's Health Insurance Program, or SCHIP, as it is popularly known, is a
joint federal state program which, for ten years beginning in 1997, provides coverage for many poor
children whose parents earn too much money to qualify for Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-jj.
SCHIP is authorized under Title XXI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1397aa-jj. Many applaud
SCHIP because it gives as an expansion of health care services for poor children and does so by
providing states with 70% of its costs. See HHS News, States May Provide SCHIP Coverage for
Prenatal Care, New Rule to Expand Health Care Coverage for Babies, Mothers, Sept. 27, 2002,
available at www.hhs.gov/news [hereinafter HHS News]. However, SCHIP is also frequently
criticized as providing a much more meager package of health benefits than Medicaid, particularly
those comprehensive Early and Periodic Screening Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSTD) benefits that
are especially important for children with disabilities. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky,
supra note 29, at 1, 3-12. Medicaid and SCHIP are both faulted, for having administrative barriers
that make it difficult for enrollees to maintain eligibility. See id. at 10; Wendy Chavkin & Paul H.
Wise, The Data Are In: Health Matters in Welfare Policy, 92 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 1392, 1393-94
(2002).
131. Section 2110 of SCHIP; 42 U.S.C. 1397jj(c)(1) (2006) (defining "child" as "an individual
under 19 years of age").
132. State Children's Health Insurance Program; Eligibility for Prenatal Care and Other Health
Services for Unborn Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 61956 (Oct. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 457)
(discussing the procedural history of the regulation, which was subsequently codified at 42 C.F.R. §
457.10) [hereinafter SCHIP Final Rule].
133. SCHIP Proposed Rule, supra note 129, at 9937.
134. This "state choice" mantra was evident throughout the Federal Register notice promulgat-
ing the final regulations, with the Department of Health and Services reiterating its view "that States
should have the option to include unborn children as eligible targeted low income children. We are
therefore retaining a revised definition [of child] . . . that permits States maximum flexibility in
extending SCHIP eligibility." SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61960.
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA). '35
Critics of the proposed regulation responded with several argu-
ments. First, the most fundamental objection to the new SCHIP regula-
tions was that they constituted an ultra vires action by HHS, since noth-
ing in the SCHIP statute or its legislative history suggested that Congress
intended "child" to have anything other than its common, everyday
meaning, as one who had been born. Critics noted that Congress knew
how to use the term "unborn child," as it had in the Medicare and Medi-
caid statutes, and that all the services covered under SCHIP, such as
"well-baby and well-child care," were manifestly applicable only to born
children. 136 Critics asserted that Congressional silence about "unborn
children" in enacting SCHIP meant that Congress had not intended them
to be covered by the SCHIP program. 137 HHS responded that the silence
meant only that Congress had not "directly spoke[n] to ... whether the
term 'child' could include unborn children."1
38
Second, critics noted that when the regulations were proposed, a bi-
partisan coalition in Congress was already working to amend SCHIP to
provide prenatal and postpartum care to pregnant women. The critics
asserted that the regulatory change to include "unborn children" was
unnecessary if in truth HHS' goal was simply to provide the needed
care. 139
Third, many objected to the regulation's blatant politicization of
maternal and children's health. 40  By adopting a definition of "child"
which was not in the statute and was inconsistent with long-standing
Supreme Court precedent that a fetus was not a child, ' 4' the HHS regula-
135. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. Law No.
104-193 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-19).
136. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61961-62.
137. See id. at 61962.
138. Id.
139. Cynthia Dailard, New SCHIP Prenatal Care Rule Advances Fetal Rights At Low-Income
Women 's Expense, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, Dec. 2002, at 3. Among the
bills pending were the Mothers and Newborns Health Insurance Act of 2001, S. 724, 107th Cong.
(2002); the Start Healthy/Stay Healthy Act of 2001, S. 1016, 107th Cong. (2001) and the Start
Healthy/Stay Healthy Act of 2001, H.R. 3729, 107th Cong. (2002); the Immigrant Children's Health
Improvement Act of 2001, S. 582, 107th Cong. (2001) and the Legal Immigrant Children's Health
Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1143, 107th Cong. (2001), all of which proposed to amend Medi-
caid and SCHIP to permit states to offer health care to more infants and pregnant women, including
immigrant women who were excluded from eligibility under the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§601 et seq.
140. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61957; Editorial, A Cynical Political Act, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 2002, at B06; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, COMMENTS ON STATE CHILDREN'S
HEALTH PROGRAM: ELIGIBILITY FOR PRENATAL CARE FOR UNBORN CHILDREN, May 6, 2002,
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/fetalrights/164001eg20020506.html [hereinafter ACLU
COMMENTS]; Dailard, supra note 139, at 5.
141. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the fetus was not a person within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). In Burns v. Alcala, the Court held, in a case
challenging the denial of welfare benefits to pregnant women under the Aid to Families with De-
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tions were part of a strategy to undermine access to abortion. 142 It surely
was not coincidental that HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson announced
the new regulations at the Conservative Political Action Committee Con-
ference, touting the Bush Administration's "commitment to the un-
born." 143
Fourth, critics charged that the regulations violated the First
Amendment in imposing a particular theological viewpoint on the
American public, i.e., that life begins at conception. 144  The critics as-
serted that poor pregnant women who did not believe that a fetus was a
child would be forced to choose between acting in conformity with their
beliefs and accepting a government benefit enshrining a different reli-
gious belief, and that this violated the Supreme Court's Free Exercise of
Religion cases. 145 HHS rejected this concern, stating that "[i]f a woman
has a religious objection, she simply would not accept SCHIP bene-
fits,' 146 ignoring the reality that many poor women need these health
care services.
Fifth, critics contended that the regulation was bad health policy, as
it provided continuity of care for the fetus but not for the woman, who
would not be entitled to post-partun care because it was her "child," and
not she, who was the patient under SCHIP. 147 Not only did this devalue
women by treating them as mere "vessels" for the fetus, but the regula-
pendent Children (AFDC) program, that pregnant women were not entitled to receive AFDC bene-
fits because "dependent child" does not include an unborn child. 420 U.S. 575, 580 (1975). The
Burns court stated:
Following the axiom that words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning
in the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary ... and reading the definition "de-
pendent child" in its statutory context, we conclude that Congress used the word "child"
to refer to an individual already born, with an existence separate from its mother.
Id. at 580-81.
142. See Elisabeth H. Sperow, Redefining Child Under the State Children's Health Insurance
Program: Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Results, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 137,
143-44 (2003).
143. Id. at 156-57 (citing Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y Health & Human Servs., Compassion-
ate Conservatism and Health Care Policy, Remarks at the Conservative Political Action Committee
Conference (Jan. 31, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/speech/2002).
144. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61963.
145. Id. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a state could
not deny unemployment insurance benefits to a person fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath
without running afoul of the First Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion. Id. at 410.
This ruling has been undercut to some extent by the Court's decision in Employment Div. of Oregon
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 890, which held that Oregon could deny unemployment benefits on
the ground of work-related misconduct, when Smith, a drug counselor, used peyote (a controlled
substance whose use was prohibited by Oregon criminal law) during a Native American Church
ceremony.
146. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61963. However, in Sherbert, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the exercise of religious freedom could not be predicated on a right/privilege dis-
tinction. 374 U.S. at 404-05 (citing American Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390 (1950);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
147. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61960, 61967-70. Further, as HHIS conceded,
although covering the "unborn child" meant continuity of coverage after birth, this did not change
the state's normal "redetermination of eligibility" period, which could, depending on state rules, fall
shortly after the child was born. See id. at 61964.
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tion was also contrary to accepted medical practice and counter-
productive for the newly born child, who depended on care from a
healthy mother. 148 These critics noted that a wide range of medical con-
ditions could affect the mother without directly affecting her fetus or
newborn, 149 and that these might not be covered under the HHS regula-
tion. 150 HHS conceded the point, declaring that "care after delivery, such
as postpartum services could not be covered as part of the Title XXI
[SCHIP] State Plan, . . . because they are not services for an eligible
child."' 151 Further, HHS informed state SCHIP administrators that states
could cover "at least one postnatal visit" only if they used a "bundled fee
payment" or "global fee method" in paying for pregnancy and delivery
services. 152 Since only twenty-eight states use this billing method, there
was concern that many new mothers would have serious gaps in their
health care. 153 There were also fears that some health care providers
would choose not to treat pregnant women under SCHIP at all, to avoid
the ethical and malpractice issues raised by having the fetus, and not the
woman, as their patient. '
54
The sixth concern was that the SCHIP change would not deliver
more care to pregnant immigrant women. 155 Commentators asserted that
because the new regulation did not exempt the states from their reporting
obligations to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, many immi-
grant women would still be afraid to request services. 
156
148. Id. at 61968-70; see also Impact on Infant and Maternal Mortality: Hearings on Unin-
sured Pregnant Women Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 107th Cong.
747 (2002) (statement of Senator Jeff Bingaman) ; see also ACLU COMMENTS, supra note 140.
149. These included "breast masses, influenza ... vaccination, . . .peptic ulcer disease,...
postpartum treatment of hemorrhage, infection, episiotomy repair, and postpartum depression."
MARCH OF DIMES COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE TO REDEFINE CHILD UNDER SCHIP, May 6,
2002, http://www.marchofdimes.com (use search function).
150. See, e.g., id.
151. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61969.
152. Letter from Dennis G. Smith, Dir., Center for Medicaid and State Operations of Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to State Health Officials (Nov. 12, 2002) (on file with author).
153. Dailard, supra note 139, at 5.
154. Id. at4.
155. HHS asserted that "the new regulation makes sure that all low-income immigrants have
access to important prenatal care for their babies." HHS News, supra note 130.
156. Dailard, supra note 139, at 5; SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61965-66. Many
immigrants continue to be deterred from seeking government supported health care for which they
and/or their children are eligible, due to confusion about eligibility requirements and fear that health
care providers or government insurance programs will report illegal immigrants to the federal en-
forcement authorities. See URBAN INSTITUTE, IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND WORKERS, THE HEALTH
AND WELL-BEING OF YOUNG CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS, Brief No. 5, Feb. 2005, at 3, available at
http://www.urban.org/publications/310584.html; KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, IMMIGRANTS' HEALTH CARE COVERAGE AND ACCESS, Aug. 2003, at 2, available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2241-index.cfm; NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER,
IMMIGRATION-FRIENDLY HEALTH COVERAGE OUTREACH AND ENROLLMENT, June 2002, at 1,
available at http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/health/Issue-Briefs/nmmigrant-Friendly.AppEnrllmnt.
PDF. Indeed, some legal immigrants are denied care; see also Julia Preston, Texas Hospitals' Sepa-
rate Paths Reflect the Debate on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2006, at Al, A18. When the
SCHIP rule was proposed, and the final rule promulgated, enforcement authority was held in the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. On November 25, 2002 President Bush signed the Home-
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Finally, critics argued that justifying the regulation as a means of
expanding health care access 157 was disingenuous and contrary to the
fiscal structure of SCHIP. Because the regulation did not (and could not)
authorize additional funding for SCHIP, it could not lead to any more
health care being delivered.158 Further, because SCHIP is optional both
with regard to states' decision to participate and the range of services
they offer, 159 states had no incentive to add "unborn children" to their
programs. In practice, these predictions have been fulfilled. Only nine
states decided to cover "unborn children" under SCHIP, 160 and one of
these-Rhode Island-had already included pregnant women under an
HHS-approved waiver. 61  Because total SCHIP funds are capped, and
many states are struggling to handle mounting Medicaid and SCHIP
costs in a time of budget shortfalls, 1 62 they are unlikely to expand SCHIP
programs. 163  Indeed, many states have been cutting or redesigning
SCHIP to limit costs.
D. Compelled Medical Treatment, Civil Commitment, and Fetal Guardi-
anships
In recent years, other efforts to "protect" fetuses from their mothers'
actions during pregnancy have increased,' 64 limiting women's autonomy
to make medical decisions for themselves. Two-thirds of states either
preclude or limit the enforcement of a woman's previously expressed
wishes about foregoing medical treatment from being implemented while
she is pregnant. 165 In addition, many states authorize the civil commit-
land Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, which transfered immigration
enforcement authority to the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, within the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security.
157. HHS News, supra note 130.
158. ACLU COMMENTS, supra note 140; see also KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, ASSESSING THE ROLE OF RECENT WAIVERS IN PROVIDING NEW COVERAGE, Dec. 2003,
at iii, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/4158.cfm [hereinafter KAISER, ASSESSING WAIVERS]
(noting that SCHIP funds are capped nationally, and that "[n]ot all states have available funds to
redirect toward coverage").
159. Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 1, 17-21.
160. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED:
STATE CHOICES INFLUENCE HEALTH COVERAGE ACCESS FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Oct. 2005,
at 19, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7393.cfm [hereinafter KAISER, IN A TIME OF
GROWING NEED].
161. HHS News, supra note 130 (noting that Rhode Island, Colorado and New Jersey had
previously obtained waivers to include pregnant women in their SCHIP programs).
162. KAISER, ASSESSING WAIVERS, supra note 158, at iv (observing that Medicaid and SCHIP
enrollment grew by about 3.2 million people in 2002, largely "because more people became eligible
for Medicaid due to the downturn in the economy").
163. Many states have cut or redesigned their SCHIP programs to limit costs. JOHN HOLAHAN
ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO 2004 BUDGET CRISES: A LOOK AT TEN STATES, URBAN INSTITUTE,
Feb. 2004, at 1-2, 7-8, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
410946 StateBudgetCrises.pdf; IAN HILL, HOLLY STOCKDALE & BRIGETTE COURTOT, SQUEEZING
SCHIP: STATES USE FLEXIBILITY TO RESPOND TO THE ONGOING BUDGET CRISIS, URBAN
INSTITUTE, June 2004, at 1-2, available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311015.
164. See generally Jerdee, supra note 4.
165. See generally id.
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ment of pregnant women for substance abuse treatment, 166 as well as
court orders that compel women to accept medical attendants at labor
and delivery, or mandate particular forms of care such as Caesarean sec-
tions.
1. The Pregnancy Exception from Advanced Medical Directives
Women have regularly been denied the right to self-determination
and bodily integrity by state laws that, in the name of "fetal protection,"
automatically invalidate advance health care directives when a woman is
pregnant. Advance directives are widely seen as an important and bind-
ing vehicle that enable competent individuals to indicate the kinds of
health care treatment they want should they become terminally ill, suffer
a stroke or other neurological injury, or are in a persistent vegetative
state, and, due to mental incapacity, can no longer make treatment deci-
sions. 167 Advance directives are particularly important for women, be-
cause of judicial gender bias in many cases in which men, but not
women, have been deemed strong, self-reliant, and courageous enough to
choose death rather than a lifetime spent in a persistent vegetative state
or other mentally compromised condition. 1
68
Yet two-thirds of states either limit absolutely or make it more diffi-
cult to enforce women's advance directives when they become pregnant.
Seventeen states provide statutory exceptions to their "living will" or
health care proxy statutes which render advance directions automatically
ineffective if the patient is pregnant. 169 Another sixteen states render the
living will or health care proxy inapplicable in a variety of circum-
stances, ranging from a possibility to a probability that the fetus will
"develop to a live birth." 170  Minnesota gives a slight bow to women's
autonomy by establishing a rebuttable presumption that a pregnant
woman would want health care to be provided if there is a "real possibil-
ity [that] .. .the fetus could survive to the point of life birth," even if
"the withholding or withdrawal of such health care would be authorized
were she not pregnant."' 17 1 The presumption can be rebutted by an ex-
166. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 48.205 (2006) (permitting the civil commitment of pregnant girls
and women, dubbed "The Cocaine Mom law"); see also Tom Kertscher, 'Cocaine Mom' Law In-
voked in Attempt to Detain Woman, Racine Case Thought to Be First Time Law is Used Without
Other Crime, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 1999, at 1.
167. See Linda C. Fentiman, Privacy and Personhood Revisited- Substitute Decisionmaking for
the Incompetent Incurably Ill Adult, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 818-828 (1989) (discussing living
wills and documents designating a medical treatment agent); see also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 842.
168. See generally Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender, and "The Right to
Die, " 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 85 (1990).
169. Jerdee, supra note 4, at 978 n.35.
170. Id. at 978-79 nn.36-44. The Alaska statute cited in n.37, ALASKA STAT § 18.12.040, was
repealed in 2004.
171. The Minnesota law states in pertinent part:
When a patient lacks decision-making capacity and is pregnant, and in reasonable Medi-
cal judgment there is a real possibility that if health care to sustain her life and the life of
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plicit statement to the contrary in the advance directive itself, or by clear
and convincing evidence presented at a hearing. 172 While Minnesota's
law endeavors to strike a balance between the woman's interest in auton-
omy and the provision of a living maternal body in which the fetus can
continue to develop, it still enshrines a normative view of women-that
any "reasonable" woman would choose to continue on life-support if it
meant that her fetus would survive until birth.
The potential impact of these statutes is substantial. In University
Health Services v. Piazzi,173 a Georgia trial court granted a hospital's
petition to continue life support for a brain-dead pregnant woman over
the objections of the woman's husband and other family members, 174 so
that a fetus could be delivered. Although Ms. Piazzi had not executed an
advance directive, the court reached out to decide the case based on the
Georgia Natural Death Act, which rendered a pregnant woman's advance
directive inoperable if the fetus was viable. 75 The court declared that
because Ms. Piazzi was brain dead, she no longer had a constitutionally
protected right to privacy, 176 but implied that even if she did, any inter-
est she had would be rendered irrelevant by the Georgia living will stat-
ute. 177
In contrast to the Piazzi court's expansive interpretation, two other
courts have rebuffed constitutional challenges to state advance directive
statutes, dismissing the cases for lack of justiciability. In DiNino v.
Gorton,178 a woman alleged that the Washington Model Health Care
Directive Act was unconstitutional because it made advance directives
ineffective during pregnancy. 179 DiNino drafted an advance directive
contrary to Washington law, and her physician refused to place it in her
medical file, asserting fears of potential liability." 0 DeNino sought a
declaratory judgment that her advance directive was valid and enforce-
the fetus is provided the fetus could survive to the point of live birth, the health care pro-
vider shall presume that the patient would have wanted such health care to be provided,
even if the withholding or withdrawal of such health care would be authorized were she
not pregnant. This presumption is negated by health care directive provisions described in
section 145C.05, subdivision 2, paragraph (a), clause (10), that are to the contrary, or, in
the absence of such provisions, by clear and convincing evidence that the patient's
wishes, while competent, were to the contrary.
MINN. STAT. § 145C.10 (g) (2006).
172. Id.
173. This unreported case, No. CV86-RCCV-464, was cited in Daniel Sperling, Maternal
Brain Death, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 453, 494-95 (2004) and Molly C. Dyke, A Matter of Life and
Death: Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 70 B.U. L. REv. 867, 871-72 (1990).
174. Daniel Sperling, Panel Discussion American Association of Law Schools Panel: Panel on
the Use of Patients for Teaching Purposes Without Their Knowledge or Consent: Article: Do Preg-
nant Women Have (Living) Will?, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 331, 336 (2005).
175. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(b) (2006).
176. Sperling, supra note 173, at 336-37.
177. Id. at 337.
178. 684 P.2d 1297 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
179. DiNino, 684 P.2d at 1299.
180. Id. at 1298-99.
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able, and that her physician would not be held liable if he acted in accor-
dance with its provisions. In the alternative, she argued the statute vio-
lated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy, which encompassed
her right to seek abortion and to forego medical treatment. 181 Her suit
was dismissed as presenting a "purely hypothetical and speculative con-
troversy."' 182  In Gabrynowicz v. Heitkamp,183 the plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of two North Dakota statutes which rendered a
woman's advance directive inoperable while she was pregnant, and fur-
ther mandated that pregnant women receive medical treatment to permit
the "continuing development and live birth of the unborn child."'
184
While the United States District Court for North Dakota acknowledged
the statutes' potential constitutional problems, it ruled that because the
plaintiff was neither pregnant nor in a terminal condition, her case was
non-justiciable. 185  What both DiNino and Gabrynowicz overlook, of
course, is that the entire point of a living will or advance directive statute
is to permit competent adults to announce their wishes for treatment prior
to becoming incapacitated, when they are able to think through their
choices. Denying a woman the opportunity to bring a constitutional
challenge while healthy and non-pregnant will mean, in practical terms,
that she will never be able to challenge the law.
2. Civil Commitment for Substance Abuse and Other Treatment
Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia currently permit
pregnant women to be civilly committed for alcohol and other drug
abuse. 186  Most of these state statutes address substance abuse in the
same way that statutes authorize the civil commitment of the mentally ill
when the mental illness poses danger to "self or others."' 87 Three states'
statutes specifically target pregnant women. 188 For example, the Minne-
sota statute requires physicians to report pregnant patients' use of alcohol
and controlled substances during pregnancy and mandates toxicology
181. Id. at 1299.
182. Id. at 1300.
183. 904 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. 1995).
184. Gabrynowicz, 904 F. Supp. at 1062. One of the statutes being challenged stated:
Notwithstanding a declaration executed under this chapter, medical treatment must be
provided to a pregnant patient with a terminal condition unless ... such medical treat-
ment will not maintain the patient in such a way as to permit the continuing development
and live birth of the unborn child or will be physically harmful or unreasonably painful to
the patient or will prolong severe pain that cannot be alleviated by medication.
N. D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07(3) (repealed 2005)
185. Gabrynowicz, 904 F. Supp. at 1063-64.
186. See supra note 37 and statutes cited therein.
187. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 125.81 (2005) (authorizing the immediate custody of a chronic
substance abuser, defined in § 125.2 (2005) as a person who "[h]abitually lacks self control as to the
use of chemical substances to the extent that the person is likely to endanger the person's health, or
to physically injure the person's self or others, if allowed to remain at liberty without treatment" and
"[l]acks sufficient judgment to make responsible decisions with respect to the person's hospitaliza-
tion or treatment").
188. MINN. STAT. § 626.5561-63 (2005); OKL. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-546.5 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-20A-70 (2006).
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testing of mothers and newborns shortly after delivery if there is reason
to believe that a mother has used controlled substances. 189 At least one
other state, Wisconsin, has amended its child abuse law to permit the
involuntary commitment of pregnant women who are abusing alcohol or
controlled substances throughout pregnancy to the extent constitutionally
permissible. 190
The Wisconsin law, popularly dubbed the "Cocaine Mom Bill," was
a reaction to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel.
Angela M W. v. Kruicki.19' When Angela M.W. was pregnant, her phy-
sician reported her to child welfare authorities after she tested positive
for drugs and failed to show up for an appointment.1 92 The court held
that Ms. M.W. could not be compelled to participate in in-patient drug
treatment through a "child custody" proceeding, concluding that the leg-
islature had not intended the term "child" in the child neglect statute to
include children not yet born. 1
93
The Arkansas Supreme Court relied on Angela M W. in Arkansas
Dep 't of Human Services v. Collier,194 a case which challenged a family
court judge's authority to declare that the fetus of a pregnant woman who
was using methamphetamines was a dependent-neglected child.' 95 Act-
ing sua sponte, the trial judge ordered the "child" to be taken into cus-
tody, by holding the woman at a county detention center until she went
into labor.' 96 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the judge's actions
exceeded her statutory authority.' 
97
In sharp contrast to these two decisions, in 2000 a Massachusetts
family court judge ordered the involuntary medical treatment of Rebecca
Corneau, a pregnant woman who rejected all medical care and was sus-
pected of membership in a religious cult that denied children adequate
nutrition and medical care. 98 The court ordered Ms. Corneau to be
taken to a prison hospital and compelled to submit to a medical examina-
tion to determine her health, pregnancy status, and the anticipated birth
date of her "unborn child," so that the court could determine what prena-
189. MINN. STAT. § 626.5561 (2005).
190. WIS. STAT. § 48.01(1) (2006).
191. 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997).
192. State ex rel. Angela M W., 561 N.W.2d at 732-33.
193. Id. at 737.
194. 95 S.W.3d 772 (2003).
195. Collier, 95 S.W.3d at 773.
196. Id. at 773; see also Bennett v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 782, 785 (2003) (holding in a related
civil contempt proceeding that the trial judge lacked authority to hold the pregnant woman in con-
tempt of court once the judge terminated her parental rights in a different case).
197. Collier, 95 S.W.3d at 781 (rejecting arguments that the term "child" in the child neglect
statute should be construed to include a fetus even though other areas of Arkansas law authorized
actions to be brought on behalf of a fetus).
198. Dave Wedge & Edwin Molina, Experts: Ruling May Just Open Up Floodgates, BOSTON
HERALD, Sept. 1, 2000, at 4.
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tal treatment should be ordered. 199 Ms. Corneau did not appeal the
judge's ruling and she was imprisoned until after her child's birth, when
the child was declared neglected and Corneau's parental rights were ter-
minated.2 °°
3. Compelled Caesarean Sections
Women continue to be forced to have Caesarean sections over their
objections. 20 1 In Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hospital,2 2 the
Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a trial judge's decision to order a
woman who was close to her delivery date to undergo a Caesarean sec-
tion, based on hospital physicians' concern that because the fetus was in
a breech position, it was likely to die in childbirth.20 3 The court rejected
Ms. Jefferson's religious objections to the procedure, but before the order
could be enforced, she gave birth to a healthy child .2°  In the landmark
case of In re A.C., 20 5 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals took a
different view, declaring that pregnant women had the right to control
their medical treatment, even when it could affect the health of the fe-
tus. 20 6 The court stated, "[s]urely, . . . a fetus cannot have rights in this
respect superior to those of a person who has already been born.
20 7
In 1996, a Florida trial court held an ex parte hearing concerning
Laura Pemberton, a pregnant woman who refused medical advice to de-
liver by Caesarean section because it was feared that her previous cae-
199. See Barbara F. v. Bristol Div. of Juvenile Court, 735 N.E. 2d 357 (Mass. 2000) (discuss-
ing the juvenile court's order in the course of rejecting a challenge to that court's decision brought
by another pregnant woman, who asserted that the juvenile court's order had a chilling effect on her
own conduct). See also Wedge & Molina, supra note 198, at 4; Dave Wedge, Appeal Cites Abortion
Ruling in Bid to Free Pregnant Cultist, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 6, 2000, at 10; Michael Paulson,
Fetus Dispute Brings Wider Issues to Fore, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 2000, at B5; Miller, supra
note 34, at 71-74.
200. Miller, supra note 34, at 73-74 nn. 31 & 34.
201. For illuminating analyses of the issues raised by these cases, see Nancy K. Rhoden, The
Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951
(1986); Roberts, Punishing Addicts nho Have Babies, supra note 9, at 964. Women of color have
borne the brunt of these interventions. Id. at 939.
202. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
203. Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
204. Id. at 459. See also Alicia Ouellette, New Medical Technology: A Chance to Reexamine
Court-Ordered Medical Procedures During Pregnancy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 927, 940 (1994).
205. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
206. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252.
207. Id. at 1244. The case arose out of tragic circumstances. In 1987, Angela Carder, a twenty-
seven year old woman who had survived cancer as a teenager, became pregnant. At twenty-five
weeks of pregnancy, she was found to be suffering from cancer again. Id. Her condition deteriorated
rapidly, and at twenty-six weeks, she was hospitalized and expected to die shortly. When the hospi-
tal sought a court order to perform a Caesarean section, a trial court held a hearing, and ordered a
Caesarean section to be performed. The baby died within two hours, and Carder died two days later.
Id. at 1238. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeal declared first that the pregnant
woman had the right to self-determination, which included the right to refuse a Caesarean section.
The court further held that in cases such as this one, where it was difficult to ascertain the pregnant
woman's wishes because she was close to death, under the influence of medication, and suffering
extreme emotional distress, the trial court should undertake a substituted judgment analysis, so that it
could decide what the patient would have chosen if she were competent. Id. at 1247-49.
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sarean section put her at higher risk for uterine rupture.2 °8 The court
ordered Ms. Pemberton to be transported to the hospital via ambulance
against her will, and then continued the hearing in her presence, ulti-
mately ordering the Caesarean section to be performed. 20 9 When Ms.
Pemberton subsequently brought a section 1983 civil rights action an
action in federal court, the court held that Ms. Pemberton's constitutional
rights "did not outweigh Florida's interest in preserving the life of the
unborn child.,
210
In a less dramatic case, in 2004 a Pennsylvania woman, Amber
Marlowe, who had previously given birth to six children, each weighing
more than eleven pounds, went to deliver her seventh child, only to be
told that the fetus was so large that it was not safe to deliver vaginally.
21
When Marlowe declined the hospital's advice to have a Caesarean sec-
tion, the hospital obtained an ex parte order compelling her to have the
212surgery. Marlowe and her husband did not learn of the order until
after she had safely delivered her baby at another hospital.213
These court-ordered detentions and medical interventions are con-
trary to the prevailing view of medical professionals that medical treat-
ment against the pregnant woman's wishes is rarely, if ever, appropri-
ate.214 The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG),
for example, emphasizes that medical judgment is limited and fallible,
that pregnant women do not lose their rights to autonomy merely by be-
coming pregnant, and, most importantly, that doctors who believe that a
medical intervention will benefit the fetus and/or the mother should ex-
haust all possible avenues of explanation and persuasion before seeking a
court order, including consultation with an institutional ethics commit-
tee.
215
Significantly, medical groups recognize the need to view pregnant
women's decisionmaking in its full social and economic context. ACOG
alerts physicians to the risk that "clinicians' conclusions reinforce exist-
208. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla.
1999). At the hearing, five physicians testified that the risk of uterine rupture during vaginal deliv-
ery was too high (from "four to six percent"), and that if there was rupture, the fetus was likely to die
during delivery. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. at 1252-53. Neither the state nor federal court addressed
the question of informed consent, that is, who was entitled to make the fetal risk assessment. See
generally id. at 1251-57 (discussing only the issues of substantive due process, procedural due
process, professional negligence, and false imprisonment).
209. Id. at 1250.
210. Id. at 1251.
211. David Weiss, Court Delivers Controversy, Mom Rejects C-Sections; Gives Birth on Own
Terms, TIMES LEADER Jan. 16, 2004; Associated Press, New Questions about Childbirth Rights,
May 19, 2004, available at http://keyetv.com/health/health-story_140110423.html.
212. Weiss, supra note 211.
213. Id.
214. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 36; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 36, at 35; American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note
36.
215. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 36, at 34-35.
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ing gender, class, or racial inequality., 21 6 The American Medical Asso-
ciation (AMA) agrees that legal interventions during pregnancy are sel-
dom, if ever, proper,21 7 and emphatically rejects "criminal sanctions or
civil liability" for pregnant women based on their conduct "toward [their]
... fetus., 218 Instead, the AMA endorses a comprehensive, long-term
approach to substance abuse, to begin in adolescence and continue
through pregnancy and beyond, in recognition of the fact that addiction
to alcohol and other drugs is a disease. 1 9
Many physicians believe that seeking judicial intervention to com-
pel women to accept treatment during pregnancy is counter-productive,
not only leading to a loss of trust in the health care system on the part of
the particular woman who is the object of the intervention, but also deter-
ring other women from seeking care. 220  This problem is compounded
when women are forcibly restrained while an unwanted medical proce-
dure is performed,22' or when pregnant women are confined in prison
hospitals, which often meet only the most minimal standards of health




Another way that courts have separated pregnant women from their
fetuses, undermining women's right to self-determination, is through the
appointment of fetal guardians. Sometimes such appointments are the
means used to compel women to accept medical treatment to benefit the
216. Id. at 35.
217. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 36 (stating that a physician might seek
judicial action to override a woman's informed treatment refusal only "[i]f an exceptional circum-
stance could be found in which a medical treatment poses an insignificant or no health risk to the
woman, entails a minimal invasion of her bodily integrity, and would clearly prevent substantial and
irreversible harm to her fetus").
218. Id.
219. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, POLICY H-420.976: ALCOHOL AND OTHER
SUBSTANCE ABUSE DURING PREGNANCY, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/noindex/category/1 1760.html (click "accept"; search "420.976"): AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, POLICY H-95.976: DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES - THE NEXT GENERATION,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11760.htm (click "accept"; search
"95.976").
220. Helene Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 J.A.M.A. 2663, 2667 (1990);
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 36, at 36. Similar concerns have
been raised about mandatory maternal HIV testing in order to reduce maternal-fetal transmission of
the virus. See, e.g., Comm. on HIV Prenatal/Newborn Testing, Prenatal/Newborn HIV Testing, 49
THE RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 420 (1994).
221. See, e.g., In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 400 (111. App. 1997) (reversing a trial
court's decision to appoint a hospital the "temporary custodian of Fetus Brown, with the right to
consent to one or more blood transfusions for [his mother] when advised of such necessity by any
attending physician").
222. Cole, supra note 220.
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fetus.223 More frequently, they are a direct challenge to a pregnant
woman's right to have an abortion.224
In Alabama, trial judges have appointed fetal "guardians" as part of
their procedures for determining whether pregnant teenagers can obtain
an abortion without parental consent, a practice whose legality the Ala-
bama Supreme Court has declined to address.22 5 Such fetal guardian-
ships turn what may already be an intimidating but parentalistic proceed-
ing into an adversarial one, effectively changing the burden of proof es-
tablished by the legislature in authorizing a judicial bypass proceed-
ing.226 For example, in one case, the trial court appointed a guardian ad
litem for the fetus, whom the court denominated "Baby Teresa., 227 The
guardian ad litem called three witnesses who worked at organizations
opposed to abortion, "Sav-A-Life" and the "COPE Crisis Pregnancy
Center," and cross-examined the minor about whether she had consulted
these or other anti-abortion groups in making her decision.228 In another
case, a judge (perhaps the same one) declared,
I have... as has been my practice for five years now, appointed a
lawyer to represent your unborn child, because I do not feel that the
court should be placed in the position of being a cross-examiner, an
advocate for one side or the other, so I've appointed someone to rep-
resent the silent voice in this case.229
In 2003, the wife of a Florida prosecutor petitioned to be appointed
guardian of the fetus in the case of a severely retarded woman who had
been raped at the group home where she resided, in order to prevent the
woman from having an abortion. 230  The rape victim suffered from au-
tism, cerebral palsy, and a seizure disorder, in addition to her retardation,
223. See, e.g., In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 400, 406 (reversing a trial court's decision to
appoint a hospital the "temporary custodian of Fetus Brown" and appointing the Cook County,
Illinois Public Guardian as the "guardian ad litem" for Fetus Brown in order to override the pregnant
woman's refusal of blood transfusions, based on her religious beliefs).
224. See Benten v. Kessler, 1192 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14747 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding in a
pregnant woman's class action suit to enjoin the Food and Drug Administration's ban on the impor-
tation of RU-486, an abortifacient drug, that an attorney could not intervene on behalf of the
woman's non-viable fetus, declaring that "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make no provision
for appointing a guardian ad litem for a fetus"). See also In re Nancy Klein, 1989 N.Y. App. Div.
LEXIS 1613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding, in the case of a comatose woman injured in a accident,
that her husband should be appointed guardian with authority to terminate her pregnancy, and that a
stranger could not be appointed guardian of her fetus, since a non-viable fetus was not "a legally
recognized 'person,"' (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))).
225. In re Anonymous, 810 So. 2d 786, 795 (Ala. 2001).
226. As one trial judge explained, "it has been my practice for three years now when I'm faced
with these cases to not only have a lawyer for you but to have a lawyer to represent the interest of
the unborn child." Id. at 789. See also In re Anonymous, 889 So. 2d 525, 525 (Ala. 2003) (Johns-
tone, J., dissenting, in discussing evidence of the trial court's bias against abortion).
227. In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d 429, 429-30 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
228. In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d at 429-30.
229. In re Anonymous, 889 So. 2d at 527 (Johnstone, J., dissenting, in discussing evidence of
the trial court's bias against abortion) (emphasis added).
230. In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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but the putative guardian only expressed concern that the woman was
taking medications which could injure the fetus. 231 Both the trial judge
and the mid-level appellate court rebuffed the request for guardianship,
holding that Florida law did not authorize such an appointment.232 They
noted that Florida law instead authorized guardians to be appointed for
mentally incompetent women to protect their interests, with the guardian
to consider whether an abortion was appropriate as "necessary to save
the life or preserve the health of the pregnant woman," subject to court
approval.233 In response to the decision in J.D.S., Governor Jeb Bush
announced his intention to seek a change in Florida law, but these efforts
have been unsuccessful so far.234
E. New Abortion Laws
New laws seeking to limit abortions reflect new fetal protection in
two different ways. First, in addition to the federal Partial Birth Abortion
Act, 235 a number of states, as well as Congress, have enacted laws which
seek to limit women's access to necessary health care by prohibiting so-
called "partial birth" abortions, a term which suggests that the fetus in
such cases is fully formed or capable of being born. 236  Second, laws
have been proposed in Congress and state legislatures which, in the name
of requiring "informed consent," make the fetus more vivid and alive,
with the goal of discouraging women from choosing abortion.
So-called "partial birth" abortion laws are criticized on four major
grounds.237 First, and foremost, these statutes do not acknowledge that
most "partial birth" abortions take place under urgent or even emergent
medical circumstances. These include the discovery that the fetus is an-
encephalic, hydrocephalic, or suffers from a fatal genetic defect, or the
determination that an alternative abortion procedure would put the
mother's health at risk.238 If "partial birth" abortions are prohibited,
231. In reJ.D.S., 864 So. 2d at 536.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 539 (discussing the requirements of FLA. STAT. ANN. 390.0111(1) and (3) (West
2006)).
234. Bob Mahlburg, Senate Chief Wary of Fetus Guardian Bill [-] Governor Finds House
Support, Won't Back Down on Legislation, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 28, 2004, at B 1,
235. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West 2006).
236. The Virginia law, for example, refers to the types of abortion prohibited as "partial-birth
infanticide." VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-7 1.1 (West 2006).
237. A full discussion of "partial-birth" abortion bans is beyond the scope of this article; in any
case, the Supreme Court will consider the constitutionality of the federal law next term. Carhart v.
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), affg Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb.
2004), cert. granted sub nom. Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006).
238. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, ABORTION AFTER THE FIRST TRIMESTER, available at
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/news-articles-press/politics-policy-issues/abortion-
access/trimester-abortion-6140.htm (citing SHELDON CHERRY & IRWIN MERKATZ, COMPLICATIONS
OF PREGNANCY: MEDICAL, SURGICAL, GYNECOLOGIC, PSYCHOSOCIAL, AND PERINATAL (4th ed.
1991) and MAUREEN PAUL, A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION (1999)).
Medical complications for the woman include infections, heart failure, malignant hypertension,
uncontrolled diabetes, renal disease, depression and suicidal tendencies. Id. In addition, many
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women may be rendered sterile or otherwise unable to have other chil-
dren, suggesting that "partial birth" abortion bans are not only anti-
female, but also "anti-life" in practice. 39 Second, these "partial birth"
laws describe abortion procedures using language inconsistent with
medical parlance, making it impossible for a physician to know whether
the technique used in a particular case is proscribed and thus rendering
the law unconstitutionally vague. 240  Third, the laws' lack of an exemp-
tion for the mother's health is incompatible with prior decisions of the
Supreme Court, which has held repeatedly that the state's interest in pro-
tecting the potential life of a fetus cannot supersede its interest in protect-
ing the health and life of the pregnant woman.2 4 1 Finally, these laws are
not limited to "late" or third trimester abortions, but could apply as early
as twelve weeks, when a fetus would clearly not be viable, and thus are
incompatible with Roe v. Wade242 and Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey.
243
Recently, proposals have been offered which, while nominally per-
mitting abortion, conceptualize the fetus as a child in order to encourage
women not to have abortions. The Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of
2005 would require that abortion providers inform all women seeking
abortion that Congress has determined that an "unborn child" may ex-
perience pain at twenty weeks or more after fertilization, 244 give each
women face barriers that delay their access to abortion until the second trimester, including poverty,
partner abuse, geographic difficulty in finding an abortion provider, and teenage status. See Brief for
Seventy-Five Organizations Committed to Women's Equality as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830), 2000 WL 340122.
239. Forcing physicians to use other, older abortion techniques increases the risk of infection
and laceration as an option increases the chance of uterine perforations, cervical lacerations, hemor-
rhaging, and infection, all of which can lead to sterility. See Women's Med. Prof'I Corp. v. Voino-
vich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1069-70, aff'd 130 F.3d 187 (1997).
240. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 939-46 (2000); see also Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d
791 (8th Cir. 2005), aff'g Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004), cert. granted sub
noma. Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006).
241. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930-3 1; Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir.
2005).
242. 410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973).
243. 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
244. Before an abortion could be performed, the woman would have to be told the following:
You are considering having an abortion of an unborn child who will have developed, at
the time of the abortion, approximately XX weeks after fertilization. The Congress of the
United States has determined that at this stage of development, an unborn child has the
physical structures necessary to experience pain. There is substantial evidence that by this
point, unborn children draw away from surgical instruments in a manner which in an in-
fant or an adult would be interpreted as a response to pain. Congress finds that there is
substantial evidence that the process of being killed in an abortion will cause the unborn
child pain, even though you receive a pain-reducing drug or drugs. Under the Federal
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, you have the option of choosing to have an-
esthesia or other pain-reducing drug or drugs administered directly to the pain-capable
unborn child if you so desire. The purpose of administering such drug or drugs would be
to reduce or eliminate the capacity of the unborn child to experience pain during the abor-
tion procedure. In some cases, there may be some additional risk to you associated with
administering such a drug.
S. 46, 109th Cong. §2902 (2005).
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woman an Unborn Child Pain Awareness Brochure,2 45 and require her to
sign an Unborn Child Pain Awareness Decision Form, indicating
whether or not she wishes to have her "pain-capable unborn child" to
receive anesthesia.24 6 Other proposals would set an even earlier date for
a woman contemplating abortion to be told about the fetus' potential to
experience pain. 247  At least one law would impose a twenty-four hour
waiting period in which the pregnant woman is to consider the informa-
tion regarding fetal pain prior to having the abortion,248 exacerbating the
pressure on women not to have an abortion.249
Although legislative mandating of explicit informed consent re-
quirements is not unprecedented,250 the Unborn Child Pain Awareness
Act of 2005 is unusual in its detailed explanation of the procedure con-
templated.251  All other laws mandating the specifics of the informed
consent dialogue require informing the patient of the consequences of the
contemplated medical procedure to her, not a third party. Imagine, for
example, a statute requiring a prospective kidney donor be told about the
impact of the decision to donate on the donor's child, because of the risk
that the donor might die after donating the kidney. Courts have increas-
ingly recognized that as competent adults, parents are able to accept or
reject medical treatment based on their personal views of what is best for
them, and have not required them to take their children's interests into
account. 252
245. This Brochure would be developed by the Department of Health and Human Services, and
include: "the same information as required under the statement under subsection (b)(2)(A)(i), includ-
ing greater detail on her option of having a pain-reducing drug or drugs administered to the unborn
child to reduce the experience of pain by the unborn child during the abortion." S. 46, 109th Cong.
§2902 (2005).
246. The law would require that the woman sign an Unborn Child Pain Awareness Decision
Form, which shall:
(A) with respect to the pregnant woman-
(i) contain a statement that affirms that the woman has received or been offered all of the
information required in subsection (b);
(ii) require the woman to explicitly either request or refuse the administration of pain-
reducing drugs to the unborn child; and
(iii) be signed by a pregnant woman prior to the performance of an abortion involving a
pain-capable unborn child.
S. 46, 109th Cong. §2902 (2005).
247. Under the Montana Unborn Child Pain Prevention Act, all women contemplating abortion
at 16 weeks or later would have to be informed that the fetus could feel pain. H.B. 238, 59th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005).
248. H.B. 238, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005).
249. Imposing a waiting period is believed to add a significant barrier to abortion access.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 228.
250. See, e.g., S.G. Nayfield et al., Statutory Requirements for Disclosure of Breast Cancer
Treatment Alternatives, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1202 (1994) (discussing state laws that require
that women contemplating mastectomy be told of the range of treatment options available); and
similar laws governing hysterectomy (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1690 (West 2006)) and
sterilization (OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 436.225 (West 2006)).
251. Cf OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-897 (1998) (popularly known as Oregon's Death with
Dignity Law).
252. See, e.g., Norwood Hospital v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 (Mass. 1991) (holding that
a mother who was a Jehovah's Witness could decline to receive a medically recommended blood
2006] THE NEW "FETAL PROTECTION"
Several legislators have introduced laws which compel women to
contemplate their fetuses as "unborn" children in other ways. These in-
clude laws that require that women be given the opportunity to visualize
their fetus in a sonogram and to hear the fetus' heartbeat, as a precondi-
253tion to the "informed consent" necessary to receive an abortion, as
well as laws that provide federal funding to purchase sonogram equip-
ment for this purpose.254 These laws increase government involvement
in a heretofore private trend: the use of sonogram technology by anti-
abortion groups, 255 which have found that women are less likely to
choose abortion if they see a sonographic image of their fetus. 
256
II. THE FETUS AND CHILD IN AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY
A. The Status of the Fetus in American Law
To put current "fetal protection" law in context, it is necessary to
trace briefly the common law and statutory trend toward recognition of
the fetus as a legal entity, although in most instances this recognition
arises after a child has been born.257 At common law the fetus was not
considered a legal person, and it was only after birth that a child had le-
gal rights. The "born alive" rule governed criminal, 258 tort,259 and inheri-
tance 2 60 law.
transfusion, even though doctors testified that without it she was likely to die, leaving her young son
with only one parent).
253. See, e.g., S.B. 76, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005) (amending title 28, article 34, chapter 2,
section 1.1 of the Indiana Code to require that at least eighteen hours prior to abortion, a woman be
told of the "availability of fetal ultrasound imaging and auscultation of fetal heart tone services to
enable the pregnant woman to view the image and hear the heartbeat of the fetus and how to obtain
access to those services").
254. The proposed Informed Choice Act would authorize the Department of Health and Human
Services to make grants to tax-exempt "community based pregnancy help medical clinic[s]" to
provide ultrasound equipment to be used to give the woman a "visual image of the fetus," informa-
tion about its probable gestational age, and information on abortion and its alternatives. H.R. Con.
216, 109th Cong. (2005).
255. Since 2001, the Department of Health and Human Services has been funding crisis preg-
nancy centers because they support President Bush's "abstinence-only" position on premarital sex
education. See Kashef, supra note 5.
256. Neela Banerjee, Church Groups Turn to Sonogram to Turn Women from Abortions, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at Al.
257. See infra notes 260-273. But see Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916, at 920
(Mass. 1975) (permitting parents to recover under a wrongful death theory due to bus company's
negligence that caused the stillbirth of a viable fetus).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 113-121 (noting the born-alive rule precluded prose-
cution for homicide for causing the death of a fetus); See also Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d
654, 655-57 (Ky. 2004) (discussing the history of the rule).
259. See, e.g., Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Dam-
ages for Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R. 3d 411 (2004).
260. See, e.g., Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909, 910 (Ga. 1951) (discussing
common law rules on inheritance, permitting children to sue after birth for interests that came into
being while they were in utero); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (amended 2005) (permitting
children conceived before an individual's death but born thereafter to inherit). See also David E.
Koropp, Note, Setting the Standard: A Mother's Duty During the Prenatal Period, 1989 ILL. L. REV.
493, 495, n.13.
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1. Tort Liability
The first case to apply the "bom alive" rule in American tort law
was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton.2 6 1 In Dietrich, a pregnant
woman slipped and fell and suffered a miscarriage, with her four or five
month old fetus living only for a few minutes. Mr. Justice Holmes, then
sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, observed that "no
case ... has ever decided that, if the infant survived, it could maintain an
action for injuries received by it while in its mother's womb." In his
view, this was wholly appropriate, since "the unborn child was a part of
the mother at the time of the injury. "
262
Dietrich was followed for seventy-five years, until the 1946 deci-
sion in Bonbrest v. Kotz. 263 In Bonbrest, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia held that a viable fetus, injured through
medical malpractice, had a cause of action against the physician who
negligently delivered him. The decision spawned a rapid retreat from the
born alive rule, accomplished by both statutory and case law. Today,
every state allows a suit for prenatal injuries if the infant is born alive,2 4
and most states permit a wrongful death suit to be brought on behalf of a
viable fetus who succumbs prior to birth due to prenatal injury.265 A
minority of states also permits suit on behalf of a non-viable fetus.
2 66
Other states have recognized causes of action for loss of consortium on
the part of parents whose fetus has been killed due to the tortious acts by
others.267
261. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
262. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17 (emphasis added).
263. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
264. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 528 (W.Va. 1995).
265. See Michael P. Penick, Wrongful Death of a Fetus, 19 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 107
(2004); Jill D. Washburn Helbling, Symposium, To Recover or Not to Recover: A State by State
Survey of Fetal Wrongful Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REv. 363 (1996). See also Meyer v. Burger
King Corp., 26 P.3d 925, 928-30 (Wash. 2001) (holding that the Washington worker's compensation
statute did not bar a suit brought by a child allegedly deprived of oxygen in utero due to his mother's
employer negligence). Indeed, employers' fear of tort liability for causing harm to the fetuses of
their female employees is a major rationale of fetal protection policies in the workplace, which
exclude some women from high-paying but hazardous positions. See Elaine Draper, Reproductive
Hazards and Fetal Exclusion Policies after Johnson Controls, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 117, 118,
121 (2001). For a fuller discussion of the gendered nature of the construction of workplace risks, see
id. and discussion infra at text accompanying notes 323-344. Nine states (California, Florida, Iowa,
Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Virginia) require that a child be born alive
before a suit for prenatal injuries can be brought. See Penick, supra; Helbling, supra.
266. See, e.g., Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d. 787 (S.D. 1996) (holding that the
South Dakota wrongful death statute should be interpreted to authorize a cause of action for wrong-
ful death for non-viable fetuses, and surveying the law in other jurisdictions in the process); Connor
v. Monkem Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89, 91-93 (Mo. 1995) (construing Missouri's wrongful death
statute to permit a cause of action for a non-viable fetus in light of a Missouri statute of general
applicability that declares that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception....").
267. See, e.g., Broadnax v. Gonzales, 809 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 2004) (permitting a woman to
recover for emotional injury for a miscarriage or stillbirth due to medical malpractice, even if she
herself does not suffer physical injury); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Iowa 1983)
(holding that a parent could recover for loss of consortium even though Iowa does not recognize a
cause of action for wrongful fetal death, because a loss of consortium action is based on parental,
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Only a handful of American courts have addressed the question of
whether tort liability can be imposed on pregnant women based on their
conduct during pregnancy. Three courts have upheld such liability,
while three courts have rejected it. These cases are important in address-
ing the normative question of who is the reasonable pregnant woman, as
well as the related question of who gets to evaluate her conduct.
Grodin v. Grodin268 was the first case to permit a woman to be sued
for her actions while pregnant. 269 The Michigan Court of Appeals al-
lowed the father of a child born with discolored teeth to sue the child's
mother (and his wife) for these injuries, allegedly caused by the woman's
taking Tetracycline® while pregnant. Without analyzing the conse-
quences of its decision for pregnant women, the court framed the ques-
tion as a simple one of fact: did the woman's use of Tetracycline® con-
stitute a "reasonable exercise of parental discretion?" If it did, this con-
duct would fall within an exception to the general abrogation of parental-
child tort immunity under Michigan law, and the woman could not be
sued.270
Two other cases, Bonte v. Bonte, 271 and National Casualty Co. v.
Northern Trust Bank of Florida, N.A.,272 also permitted suit to be
brought on behalf of children who were injured due to their mothers'
alleged negligence while pregnant. In Bonte, the mother was struck by a
car while crossing the street and her child was born with severe brain
damage and cerebral palsy. 273 The New Hampshire Supreme Court held
that a suit could go forward, relying on the abrogation of parent-child tort
immunity (in part in recognition of the availability of insurance as a
source of recovery) and the law that a child born alive can bring a cause
of action for injuries suffered in utero against a third party.274 The court
rejected the argument that either the unique relationship between a preg-
nant woman and her fetus or the potential deprivation of a woman's right
to control her life during pregnancy should preclude liability. 275 The
court held that a pregnant woman was "required to act with ... the same
standard of care as that required of her once the child is born. 276
rather than fetal, loss). Loss of consortium has been recognized as a cause of action at least since the
time of Hammurabi, although his code explicitly calculated damages based on the social class of the
pregnant woman. The Code of Hammurabi, §§ 209 and 213 (L.W.King trans.), available at
http://www.leb.net/-farras/history/hammurabi.htm (declaring that a free born woman was entitled to
receive ten shekels for her loss while a maid-servant was entitled to receive two shekels).
268. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
269. Grodin, 310 N.W.2d 869.
270. The court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine the "'reasonableness' of the
[mother's] alleged negligent conduct." Id. at 871.
271. 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992).
272. 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
273. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 464.
274. Id. at 465-66.
275. Id. at 466.
276. Id.
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A similar result was reached by a Florida appellate court in National
Casualty Co., which ruled that a child could sue its mother for injuries
allegedly caused by her negligent driving while pregnant, up to the
amount of her automobile insurance coverage.277 The court's brief opin-
ion held that there was no reason to "den[y]... recovery merely because
of the identity of the tortfeasor, '' 278 rejecting concerns about the impact
of its decision on the mother's privacy and personal health, and distin-
guishing State v. Ashley, in which the Florida Supreme Court held a
pregnant woman who shot herself and caused the death of her fetus could
not be charged criminally.
279
In contrast, three courts have adamantly rebuffed suits brought by
children against their mothers for injuries suffered in utero. In Stallman
v. Youngquist,280 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a child who suf-
fered prenatal injuries in a car accident in which her mother was driving
could not sue her mother for negligence. 281 The court first criticized the
Grodin decision, suggesting that the Michigan court had confused the
question of whether parental tort immunity should be abrogated with the
different issue of whether a pregnant woman owed a tort duty to her fe-
tus. 282 The Stallman court confronted the latter issue directly. It empha-
sized that the relationship between a pregnant woman and the fetus she
was carrying was unique and "unlike the relationship between any other
plaintiff and defendant,, 283 and thus could not be analogized to other
negligence situations. The Illinois Supreme Court held that in view of
the "fact of life" that a pregnant woman's "every waking and sleeping
moment... shapes the prenatal environment which forms the world for
the developing fetus, 284 it was impermissible to impose a duty of care
on a pregnant woman.285
The court asserted four grounds for its decision. First, it would be
impossible to either limit or define the duty of a pregnant woman toward
her fetus, since many actions taken in a woman's life, even prior to con-
ception, could affect a fetus.286 Second, it would be impossible to de-
velop an objective standard applicable to women from diverse socio-
economic backgrounds, whose access to health care differed, and who
might or might not know whether they were pregnant.287 Third, the court
recognized that creating a common law cause of action had the potential
277. National Casualty, 807 So. 2d 86.
278. Id. at 87.
279. Id. at 87-88 (citing State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1997)).
280. 531 N.E.2d 355 (I11. 988).
281. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
282. Id. at 358.
283. Id. at 360.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 359-61.
286. Id. at 360.
287. Id.
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for "unprecedented intrusion into the privacy and autonomy of the [fe-
male] citizens of this State., 218 It held that if a duty was to be recog-
nized, it must be by the legislature, "only after thorough investigation,
study, and debate., 289 Finally, the court urged that "[t]he way to effectu-
ate the birth of healthy babies is not... through after-the-fact civil liabil-
ity in tort for individual mothers, but rather through before-the-fact edu-
cation of all women and families about prenatal development.,
290
Chenault v. Huie291 addressed the more difficult factual circum-
stances in which Huie, a pregnant woman (and her boyfriend) abused
alcohol and other drugs while she was pregnant, and she gave birth to a
child with developmental problems and cerebral palsy. 292 Huie's sister
sued on behalf of the child, seeking compensatory and punitive damages
for Huie's alleged negligence and gross negligence.293 The Texas Court
of Appeals declined to recognize a child's common law cause of action
against its mother for prenatally-caused injuries. The court declared that
while "the law wisely no longer treats a fetus as only a part of the
mother, the law would ignore the equally important physical realities of
pregnancy if it treated the fetus as an individual entirely separate from
his mother., 294 The court pointed to the difficulty of establishing an
objective, uniform standard of care for pregnant and potentially pregnant
women, noting the inevitable subjectivity of after-the-fact jury decision-
making, which would lead to inconsistent and unpredictable jury ver-
dicts, as well as the invasion of women's autonomy and right to control
their daily lives. 295 The court declared that recognizing a duty of women
toward their fetuses was the province of the legislature, which alone
could conduct the necessary "research and analysis of scientific and
medical data ... [and] evaluat[e] ... broad matters of public policy.
296
Finally, the court expressed the concern that imposing civil liability
might be counterproductive, because women who feared civil liability
might not be candid with their physicians, and thus would receive less
than adequate prenatal care.297
In 2004, in Remy v. MacDonald,298 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court declined to permit a child to sue its mother for prenatal
harm.299 In Remy, the plaintiff alleged that her mother drove negligently
while pregnant, causing the plaintiff to be born prematurely with adverse
288. Id. at 361.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
292. Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 475-76.
295. Id. at 477-78.
296. Id. at 478.
297. Id.
298. 801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 2004).
299. Remy, 801 N.E.2d at 266.
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health consequences. The court followed Stallman and Chenault, em-
phasizing the substantial disagreement about whether pregnant women
should be held liable for causing fetal harm, observing that there were
virtually unlimited circumstances in which a woman could be sued, and
declaring that there was no principled way to limit the liability of preg-
nant women for causing fetal harm to the motor vehicle context. 300 The
court explicitly rejected the reasoning of Grodin, Bonte, and National
Casualty Co., and found that courts should recognize "that there are in-
herent and important differences between a fetus, in utero, and a child
already born, that permits [sic] a bright line to be drawn around the zone
of potential tort liability of one who is still biologically joined to an in-
jured plaintiff.
' 30 1
The approach of Remy, Stallman, and Chenault is similar to that set
forth by the Supreme Court of Canada, whose reasoning is instructive.
The Court has held consistently over the last fifteen years that a pregnant
woman and her fetus share a unique relationship, in which there is only
one legal person, rather than two persons with potentially adverse posi-
302tions. In Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G.
(D.F.), the Court noted, "[T]he law has always treated the mother and
unborn child as one. To sue a pregnant woman on behalf of her unborn
fetus therefore posits the anomaly of one part of a legal and physical
entity suing itself., 30 3 In Dobson v. Dobson, the Court explained that
there was no principled way to limit the circumstances under which the
woman could be held liable, due to the extraordinarily close physical
proximity between the woman and her fetus, and the enormous range of
actions which the woman could take which could have a detrimental
effect on fetal development. 304 "Everything the pregnant woman eats or
drinks, and every physical action she takes, may affect the foetus.
' 30 5
The Court further identified two important public policy concerns "mili-
tat[ing] against the imposition of maternal tort liability for prenatal neg-
ligence[:] ... the privacy and autonomy rights of women and . . . the
difficulties inherent in articulating a judicial standard of conduct for
pregnant women.' ' 306  The Court emphasized that simply because a
woman is pregnant, she does not lose "the right to make personal deci-
sions, to control [her] ... bodily integrity, and to refuse unwanted medi-
300. Id. at 264-66.
301. Id. at 267.
302. Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 925 IM
27-29 (holding that a pregnant woman addicted to solvents could not be civilly committed for treat-
ment) and Dobson v. Dobson, [1999] 174 D.L.R. (4th) I 1 (rejecting tort liability for a pregnant
woman who allegedly drove negligently, causing injury to her fetus and declaring that, "[t]he rela-
tionship between a pregnant woman and her foetus is unique and innately recognized as one of great
and special importance to society").
303. Winnipeg Child & Family Services, 3 S.C.R. at 27.
304. See Dobson 174 D.L.R.. at 20.
305. Id. at 27.
306. Id. at 21.
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cal treatment. The Court finally noted the difficulty in developing a
workable judicial standard of conduct for pregnant women, stating it
would be impossible to articulate an objective standard because the con-
text of every pregnant woman's life is different, with women who are
well-educated and ignorant, rich and poor, with and without access to
good health care and good prenatal care. 308 The court observed that "the
reasonable pregnant woman" standard would inevitably be interpreted in
light of the trier of fact's prejudices about the proper conduct of pregnant
women. 309
2. Child Neglect and Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights
In contrast to the split over whether pregnant women should be li-
able for prenatal torts, all states agree that a woman's use of alcohol or
other drugs while pregnant is a proper trigger for taking custody of a
child as "neglected," and may be the basis for terminating her parental
rights.310 The jurisprudence in this area can be succinctly summarized:
"Courts rarely side with drug abusing parents where children are con-
cerned."3  Courts do differ, however, over the jurisdictional question of
whether a fetus may be considered a child and the further question of
whether a woman's substance abuse during pregnancy is in itself suffi-
cient to justify the loss of parental rights.31 2
307. Id. at 1 32 (citing the ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES,
PROCEED WITH CARE: FINAL REPORT ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 955-56 (1993)).
308. Id. at 54.
309. Id. at 53.
310. Some states statutes explicitly authorize courts to consider prenatal substance abuse. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 19-3-102(l)(g) (West 2005) (declaring that a child is neglected or
dependent if it is born with controlled substances in its system); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7001-
1.3(14)(c) (West 2006) (declaring that a child born dependent on controlled substance is a "deprived
child"). Other states have achieved the same result through judicial interpretation of more general
child neglect criteria. See, e.g., In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (applying
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (a) (West 2006) to a child born to a mother who ingested drugs
during pregnancy); In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2000) (holding that a new-
bom with a positive toxicology screen is per se an abused child under the Ohio civil child abuse
statute); see also In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (quoting N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 (a) (iii) (1981)) (holding that allegations that a mother admitted drug use
while pregnant and that her infant had a positive toxicology test are sufficient to permit a child
neglect proceeding to go forward).
311. Mary E. Taylor, Annotation, Parent's Use of Drugs as Factor in A ward of Custody of
Children, Visitation Rights, or Termination of Parental Rights, 20 A.L.R. 5th 534, §2 [b] (2005).
312. In In re Valerie D., the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a woman's use of drugs
while pregnant could not, standing alone, justify the termination of her parental rights, and also
found that by taking the child away immediately after birth, the state made it impossible for the
mother to establish that she had an appropriate and ongoing relationship with her child. 613 A.2d
748, 752-53 (Conn. 1992). See also In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-
120171, 905 P.2d 555, 558 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that "while chronic use of drugs or alco-
hol by either parent during the mother's pregnancy may reflect a pattern of substance abuse and may
be so telling of the kind of environment to which the child will be born as to justify the child's im-
mediate removal from the parents at birth, chronic substance abuse during pregnancy in and of itself
does not reflect an inability to parent that would justify severance of a parent's fundamental rights");
see also supra text accompanying notes 201-13 (regarding the jurisdiction of juvenile and family
courts over fetuses, as opposed to children). Other courts have come to a different conclusion, cf In
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 84:2
As always in child abuse and neglect cases, there are competing
goals and strategies, which are magnified in the case of parents 313 who
use alcohol and other drugs. The law's basic premise is that it is the
child's, rather than the parent's, best interests, which are paramount.
This leads to early intervention by child welfare authorities to protect a
child at risk,3 14 and means in practice that many courts have ruled that
children born with positive toxicology screens for illegal drugs and/or
other evidence of prenatal drug exposure may be temporarily removed
from their parents' custody.3 15 On the other hand, parental advocates
may urge a watchful waiting period and argue that more family support
services and drug treatment should be provided, in order to make it more
likely that children may remain with their parents, whose interest in the
enjoyment of a relationship with their children is constitutionally pro-
tected.316 The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (AFSA)317 gives
states financial incentives to expeditiously terminate parental rights, with
the laudable goal of not leaving children in foster care limbo while their
parents struggle to get their lives in order.318 Since the law translates "the
best interests of the child" as "less time spent in foster care," the result
has been faster termination of parental rights.31 9 Many commentators
have asserted that "the 12-month permanency clock for children ignores
the clock of treatment for addiction, which is at best 24 months," and that
the statute operates in a draconian and counter-productive manner in the
re Baby Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462, 464 (Ohio 2000), but in most cases there are factors in addition
to the mother's prenatal drug use that are cited in support of the decision to terminate parental rights.
See, e.g., In re W.A.B., 979 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
313. It is important to remember that there are often two parents involved, and frequently that
the father is also a drug user or the one whose physical and emotional abuse exacerbates the
mother's vulnerability to drug use. See Francisco G. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001) (upholding the termination of a father's parental rights where his alcohol abuse and
domestic violence had not been addressed and he supported the mother's assertion that she did not
have a drug problem when there was overwhelming evidence to the contrary).
314. See, e.g., In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d at 284 ("[A] court cannot and should
not 'await broken bone or shattered psyche before extending its protective cloak around [a] child
pursuant to... article 10 of the Family Court Act ....' (citations omitted)). Courts have justified
their decision by citing the child's "right to begin life with a sound mind and body." Stallman, 531
N.E.2d at 358 (citations omitted).
315. See, e.g., In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. at 877 (holding that there was substantial evidence
to support the juvenile court's finding that a newborn was "in need of proper and effective parental
care or control" in light of the infant's positive toxicology results for opiates and amphetamines,
post-birth behavior which suggested prenatal drug exposure, and the mother's continued drug use
after losing custody of another child due to her drug use).
316. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); In
re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246, 1251 (N.J. 1999).
317. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections in
42 U.S.C.A.).
318. 42 U.S.C.A § 671(a)(15) (West 2006).
319. See Laureen D'Ambra, Terminating the Parental Rights of the Mentally Disabled, 49 R. 1.
BAR. J. 5, 7 (2001) (discussing the law's shorter time frames for children to remain in foster care,
with the goal of promoting permanent placement for children); Dorothy Roberts, The Challenge of
Substance Abuse for Family Preservation Policy, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 72, 73-76 (1999).
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case of drug-abusing women. 320 The AFSA's push for a quick decision
about termination of parental rights is also problematic in view of most
states' inadequate drug treatment resources. 321 Many drug treatment
programs are simply not tailored to mothers, who need both child care
and a treatment philosophy different from the "confrontational" and in-
dividually focused style typical of drug treatment programs designed
with the male drug addict in mind.32
B. The Failure to Protect Fetuses and Children from Work-Related
Harms
In contrast to the emphasis of prosecutors, child abuse agencies, and
some tort plaintiffs on the mother's body and behavior as the locus of
both fetal harm and protection, government and private actors have
largely been silent about systemic deficits in the American workplace
that place parents and their offspring at risk. Two aspects of workplace
life bear special scrutiny: the dangers to fetal and childhood develop-
ment posed by male and female workers' exposure to toxic substances,
and the lack of economically viable parental leave policies, which pre-
vent many parents from adequately addressing the health and emotional
needs of their newborns and young children.
1. Workplace Exposure to Hazardous Substances
Employers have responded to the risk that workplace exposure to
toxins and other dangerous substances will injure future children by en-
320. See Roberts, supra note 319, at 77, 86 (quoting Cornelia Grunman, Parents Give Advice
on Reforming DCFS; Agency Criticized at Panel Hearings, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 1999, at Metro
Chicago 3).
321. Federal law requires 5% of its Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment (SAPT) Block
Grant program to improve drug treatment access for pregnant women, but states may seek a waiver
of this requirement if they can show that there are no access problems. See 45 C.F.R. § 96.124
(1993)(c)-(d). Only 14% of the drug treatment facilities in the United States have program specifi-
cally designed to treat pregnant and postpartum women. OFFICE of APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE
ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES (N-SSATS): 2003, DATA ON
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FACILITIES 38 (Sept. 2004),
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/04nssats/nssatsrpt_04.pdf. Compounding the lack of adequate treat-
ment facilities for pregnant women, only 35% of the facilities had programs for persons needing
treatment for both substance abuse and mental illness. Id. at 37. Such individuals are especially
likely to fall through the cracks of government sponsored program, as legislation is usually targeted
at one, but not the other, of these illnesses. Georganne Chapin, Sanctioning Substance-Abusing
Home Relief Clients with the Loss of Medical Benefits-Legal and Policy Concerns, 7 N.Y.S. BAR
ASS'N HEALTH L. J. 35, 39 (Spring 2002).
322. See Roberts, supra note 319, at 78; Mary O'Flynn, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997: Changing Child Welfare Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 243, 262 (1999); Kathryn T. Jones, Prenatal Substance Abuse:
Oregon 's Progressive Approach to Treatment and Child Protection Can Support Children, Women
and Families, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 797 (1999); Holly A. Hills, Deborah Rugs & M. Scott
Young, Justice, Ethics, and Interdisciplinary Teaching and Practice: The Impact of Substance Abuse
Disorders on Women Involved in Dependency Court, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 359 (2004); Jane C.
Murphy & Margaret J. Potthast, Domestic Violence, Substance Abuse and Child Welfare: The Legal
System's Response, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 88 (1999).
20061
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 84:2
acting "fetal protection" policies limiting the exposure of women of
child-bearing age to such substances.323 The Supreme Court ruled in
1991 in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls3 24 that a fetal
protection policy which excludes women from the workplace as a means
of reducing the risk that a child will be harmed by prenatal toxic expo-
sure constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.325 The employer's actions will be illegal unless the
employer can demonstrate that its policy is a bona fide occupational
qualification, that is, "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
the particular business." 326  However, many employers still implement
"fetal protection" policies, admitting in effect that they would rather be
sued for sex discrimination than for damages for causing prenatal in-
jury.327 These employers continue to focus exclusively on the risks of
harm to future children posed via the female body (including harm to the
woman's reproductive system and to the fetus) rather than acknowledge
the harm that many substances pose to the male reproductive system.
However, when studies show that a substance poses harm to the male
reproductive system, industry and government frequently have acted to
ban the substance entirely.32 8
2. Parenting Leaves
American law has also failed to mandate paid parenting leaves,
which would permit parents to take care of newborns, as well as older
children who become ill. Although the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA)329 requires employers of more than fifty employees to grant
323. Although the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-678 (West 2006),
and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2692 (West 2006), both mandate that
the government set safe levels of workplace exposure to many dangerous substances, both acts have
been weakened by court rulings about the level of scientific proof required for the government to
demonstrate "significant risk." See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that before promulgating any occu-
pational safety and health standard, the Secretary of Labor must find that there are "significant risks"
in a workplace which can be eliminated or decreased by a change in the standard).
324. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
325. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 207.
326. Id. at 200 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)(1)). In Johnson Controls, the defendant com-
pany manufactured batteries, in which lead was a major ingredient. Although the company initially
permitted pregnant women to work in the manufacturing process, informing them of the dangers of
lead exposure, after eight women tested with higher blood lead levels than recommended by OSHA,
the company issued a "fetal protection" policy. This policy excluded "'all women except those
whose inability to bear children is medically documented,"' but it made no provision for men to
lower their lead exposure, which has also been shown to pose a risk of fetal harm. Id. at 190-92.
327. Draper, supra note 265, at 121.
328. The pesticide ethylene dibromide (EDB), for example, was cancelled because of its onco-
genic and mutagenic risks, as well as reproductive risks to male workers. See EPA Limitation on
Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,234 (Oct. 11, 1983); see also OS14A Limitation on Levels of
Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,956 (Department of Labor docu-
ment regarding EDB's effects on male reproductive capacity); cf Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187
(1991).
329. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.A, 5
U.S.C.A., 29 U.S.C.A.).
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employees up to twelve weeks a year of unpaid leave for the birth or
adoption of a child or for reasons related to illness, 330 many critics assert
that this is insufficient to support vulnerable children in need of parental
attention and that the unpaid character of such parental leave means that
existing race and class hierarchies are not remedied. 331  The United
States' policy stands in marked contrast to those of other developed na-
tions, which give much more generous leaves to working parents.
332
Almost half of American workers are not covered by the FMLA,333 and
even among those who are, only a fraction avail themselves of its leave
provisions, because they cannot afford not to work.334 No federal law
mandates paid parental leave for the period connected with pregnancy,
childbirth, and the early stages of infancy, 335 and California and Ohio are
the only two states to mandate any form of paid parental leave.336 In
contrast, other developed nations either mandate or offer paid parenting
leave, at least for some portion of this critical stage of fetal and child-
hood health and development, 337 and many countries offer additional
financial or child-care support to single parents, those who are most
likely to need leave from work to care for a newborn or ill child and are
simultaneously the least likely to be able to afford to do SO.
3 3 8
America's failure to provide paid leave for child-bearing and par-
enting is both physically and socially harmful to children, as well as eco-
nomically short-sighted. Many studies indicate that breast-feeding pro-
vides important health benefits to newborns,339 and it is certainly much
330. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(4)(a)(i) (West 2006) (defining "Employer" as any person employ-
ing more than 50 people); 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1)(B), (C) (entitling an employee to 12 weeks
leave for the birth or adoption of a child).
331. Nancy E. Dowd, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Ten Years of Experience:
Race, Gender, and Work/Family Policy, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 219, 222-31 (2004) [hereinafter
Ten Years of Experience].
332. Id. at 231-36.
333. Erin Gielow, Note, Equality in the Workplace: Why Family Leave Does Not Work, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1539 (2002)
334. Id. at 1546.
335. In April 2006, Representative Caroline Maloney introduced HR 5148, the Federal Em-
ployees Paid Parental Leave Act. The Act would ensure paid leave for 6 of the 12 weeks that federal
employees are authorized to take parental leave. H.R. 5148, 109th Cong. (2006) (referred to H.
Comm. on Gov't Reform), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5148:.
336. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3300 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.136 (West
2006) (providing that permanent government employees shall receive 70% of their salary for four of
the six weeks in which they are authorized to take parental leave).
337. Dowd, supra note 331 at 233-36 (summarizing European Union law, and comparing, inter
alia, the approach of France, which mandates maternity leave and provides much more generous
paid leaves to mothers than to fathers, and Sweden, which is gender-neutral in its paid parenting
leave policies); see also Naomi S. Stem, The Challenges of Parental Leave Reforms for French and
American Women: A Call for a Revived Feminist-Social Theory, 28 VT. L. REV. 321, 324-25 (2004)
(describing the French statutory scheme).
338. Gielow, supra note 333, at 1547.
339. American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Breast Feeding and the Use of Hu-
man Milk, I 15 PEDIATRICS 496, 496-97 (2005); see also Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding in the
American Workplace, 9 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 471, 474-76 (2001); Judy Heymann,
Editorial, We Can Afford to Give Parents a Break, WASH. POST, May 14, 2006, at B07.
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
easier to breastfeed when not working full-time. 340  Both newborns and
older children whose health needs are not met promptly are likely to be
sicker for longer periods of time, adding to state and federal health care
expenditures. 341  In addition, parents who are distracted by ill children
left at home may be less productive workers.342 Studies of parental leave
practices in other countries show that parents who are given generous
paid leaves to care for their children rarely abuse it, 343 and that children,
parents, and employers benefit when the law provides a framework for
parents to care for their children's health without jeopardizing the famil-
ial economy. 3"
C. Environmental Exposures
Children and fetuses are exposed to an astounding number of toxins,
teratogens, mutagens, and carcinogens in the environment.345 While the
full effects of these exposures are not yet known,34 6 and a comprehensive
discussion of environmental hazards is beyond the scope of this paper,
one recent example of government actions putting children at risk is in-
structive. In March 2005 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
promulgated the so-called Clean Air Mercury Rule,34 7 which reversed a
2000 EPA rule and substantially expanded the ability of American power
plants to continue to emit mercury and other toxic air pollutants. The
EPA announced that coal- and oil-burning power plants were not subject
to the requirements of § 112 of the Clean Air Act, which would have re-
quired them to install new equipment to reduce mercury emissions. In-
stead, the new rule created a complicated system of "cap-and-trade" pol-
340. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 339 at 498; Christrup, supra note 339, at
480-81.
341. Cf KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 12 (citing a study in
Washington State showing that children who lack health care insurance were less likely than those
who do to have had a clinic or physician visit within six months and are twice as likely to have
received care at an emergency room during the same period).
342. See Gielow, supra note 333, at 1541-43.
343. DECKER, supra note 64, at 10 ("Contrary to the widely held belief that employees would
abuse a liberal leave policy, the average usage rate of [Sweden's generous leave policy, which is 90
days per year to care for a sick child] ... is seven days a year.").
344. See Gielow, supra note 333, at 1540-42.
345. In recognition of the risks posed by these exposures, in 1997 President Clinton formed a
Task Force on Environmental Health and Safety Risks to Children, to improve inter-agency coopera-
tion within the federal government to provide greater protections for children's health. Exec. Order
No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (April 23, 1997).
346. Robert L. Brent & Michael Weitzman, The Current State of Knowledge About the Effects,
Risks, and Science of Children's Environmental Exposures, 113 PEDIATRICS 1158, 1159, 1164-65
(2004), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/1 13/4/Sl/1 158 (noting the wide
range of conclusions reached about the risk that pesticides and other environmental toxicants pose to
children, urging that more, carefully controlled, studies be undertaken to evaluate issues such as the
susceptibility of children compared with adults, the impact of exposure to multiple environmental
hazards, and observing that where there is sufficient data to act, as in the case of lead, there is no
reason to delay).
347. Mark D. Sullivan & Christine A. Fazio, The EPA 's New Clean Air Rules: Mixed Results
for Air Quality, N.Y. ST. B.J. 11, 15 (Jan. 2006); 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
[Vol. 84:2
THE NEW "FETAL PROTECTION"
lution allowances which permitted the power plants to increase their
mercury pollution by purchasing emissions allowances from other facili-
ties.348 Since half of all Americans live within thirty miles of a coal-
burning power plant, children and their families living near a power plant
were likely to be exposed to substantially more mercury emissions than
they are now. 9 Eleven states filed suit to invalidate the new Rule.350
Congressional critics also sought to overturn the Rule, citing the
significant risks that mercury poses to fetuses and children. They noted
that mercury was a recognized neurotoxin, which causes devastating
effects on fetuses and young children because it interferes with normal
brain development. They further noted that 4.9 million women of child-
bearing age have elevated levels of mercury, 630,000 infants are born
with elevated mercury levels, and 1,500 children are born each year with
mental retardation due to in utero exposure to mercury.35' Ultimately,
this Congressional effort was defeated. Although EPA agreed to recon-
sider the rule,352 in May 2006 the agency reaffirmed its original posi-
353tion.
D. Lack of Health Care Access in the United States and Its
Consequences
1. Uninsured Children and Adults
Americans continue to lack health insurance coverage in record
numbers. In 2005, 51.4 million Americans (almost 18%) were uninsured
for at least some part of the previous year, and 29.3 million (more than
10%) had been uninsured for more than a year.354 Although children
were more likely than adults to have health insurance, 9.2 million chil-
348. Sullivan & Fazio, supra note 347, at 15-16; Kim McGuire, New Mercury Rules Decried,
Environmental Coalition Plans Lawsuits over EPA Changes, Activists Say the New Limits Will Allow
More Mercury Pollution from Coal-Burning Power Plants-Which They Say Violates the Clean Air
Act, DENVER POST, May 18, 2005, at B-02.
349. Mark Clayton, In Bid to Cut Mercury, US Lets Other Toxins Through, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 31, 2005, at 13, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/
0331/pl3sOl-sten.html (noting also that coal-fired power plants also emit many other serious pollut-
ants, including "vanadium, barium, zinc, nickel, hydrogen fluoride, hydrochloric acid, ammonia, and
selenium").
350. Don Hopey, 11 States Sue EPA on Mercury Rules: Pennsylvania Joins suit Saying Emis-
sion Standards Inadequate, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 19, 2005, available at
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05139/507051 .stm.
351. Senate Debate on Disapproval of EPA Rule Promulgation, 151 CONG. REC. S9912,
S9913-14 (2005).
352. Sullivan & Fazio, supra note 347, at 16.
353. EPA, FINAL RULE RECONSIDERING TWO MERCURY ACTIONS: (1) RECONSIDERATION OF
RULE REVISING EARLIER REGULATORY FINDING AND REMOVING CERTAIN ELECTRIC STEAM
GENERATING UNITS FROM THE LIST OF SOURCE CATEGORIES; AND (2) RECONSIDERATION OF THE
CLEAN AIR MERCURY RULE FACT SHEET 1, 2 (May 31, 2006),
http://www.epa.gov/air/mercuryrule/pdfs/fs20060531 .pdf.
354. ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE:
ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2005 1
(Mar. 2006), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur200603.pdf.
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dren (more than 12%) lacked health insurance for some portion of the
year and an additional 3.9 million (more than 5%) had been without
health care coverage for more than a year.355 There are also substantial
racial and ethnic disparities in insurance status, with Hispanics suffering
the greatest access problems, although African-Americans also lagged
behind their white counterparts. One-third of all Hispanics were unin-
sured for at least part of the previous year and one-quarter lacked health
care coverage for more than a year. 356 About 13% of pregnant women
lack health insurance coverage, 357 despite efforts to expand Medicaid
during the last two decades.358 Medicaid does insure a greater proportion
of pregnant than non-pregnant women,359 and pays for a third of all
American births.36°
The consequences of lack of health insurance for adults and chil-
dren are profound. While prenatal care is seen as an important factor in
leading to good birth-outcomes, 36' many poor and low-income American
women continue to lack prenatal care,362 and those who receive some
prenatal care often receive it late in pregnancy, when it is less effec-
tive.363 Similarly, while pediatricians and health policymakers agree that
well-child visits are essential to providing necessary screening and other
preventative care, 364 half of uninsured children fail to have even one
well-child visit a year.365 Children with private health insurance cover-
age are much more likely to have received all necessary immunizations
than those who are uninsured or have government health insurance.366
355. Id. at 8. This percentage that has not changed since 2002. Id. at 2-3.
356. Id. at 4. See also URBAN INSTITUTE, HEALTH INSURANCE TRENDS (2005), available at
http://www.urban.org/tookit/issues/healthinsurance.cfm?renderforprint--l.
357. KENNETH E. THORPE, JENNIFER FLOME & PETER JOSKI, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE AMONG PREGNANT WOMEN, 1999 5-6 (2001), available at
http://www.marchofdimes.com/files/2001FinalThorpeReport.pdf. Forty-seven percent of poor
pregnant women lacked Medicaid coverage in 1999. Id. at 10.
358. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32, at 5; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-91-10: PRENATAL CARE: EARLY SUCCESS IN ENROLLING WOMEN MADE
ELIGIBLE BY MEDICAID EXPANSIONS 7-8 (Feb. 1991), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/d21t9/143346.pdf (describing legislative changes).
359. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32.
360. NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES, MATERNAL AND
CHILD HEALTH UPDATE 2002: STATE HEALTH COVERAGE FOR LOW-INCOME PREGNANT WOMEN,
CHILDREN, AND PARENTS 1 (June 10, 2003), http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/MCHUPDATE02.pdf.
361. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 8-9 (analyzing results of Medicaid expansions of the 1980's and early 1990's).
364. See, e.g., MEDICAID FACTS, supra note 29, at 1. The American Academy of Pediatrics
recommends that children receive 10-11 well-child visits before the age of three, in order for pedia-
tricians to monitor child behavior and development and prevent illness and behavioral and educa-
tional problems in the future. Steven Blumberg, Neal Halfon, & Lynn M. Olson, National Survey of
Early Childhood Health, National Survey of Early Childhood Health: Parents' Views on Preventive
Care for Infants and Toddlers, 113 PEDIATRICS 1899 (2004), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/I 13/6/S1/1899.
365. URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356.
366. National Survey of Early Childhood Health, National Survey of Early Childhood Health:
Parents' Views on Preventive Care for Infants and Toddlers, supra note 364, at 6.
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2. Medicaid and SCHIP Need Improvement
Medicaid is a partnership between state and federal governments,
which provides health insurance to the very poorest of American children
and adults, persons with disabilities, and elderly needing long-term
care. 367 All states participating in Medicaid agree to provide the same set
of federally mandated services for children,368 which are known as Early
and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment Services (EPSDT).369
These provide essential care for children, particularly those with disabili-
ties and other special needs. 370  However, many children have not re-
ceived the mandated EPDST benefits, either because they cannot find a
371physician willing to accept the low Medicaid reimbursement rates, or
because some states have failed to adequately define the EPSDT services
in their managed care contracts.372 Several suits have been brought by
groups of parents challenging the denial of benefits,373 but it has been an
uphill struggle to ensure that children enrolled in Medicaid receive all the
367. For a good overview of the Medicaid program, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-01-749, MEDICAID: STRONGER EFFORTS NEEDED TO ENSURE CHILDREN'S ACCESS TO
HEALTH SCREENING SERVICES 1-8 (July 2001) [hereinafter GAO, MEDICAID REPORT].
368. States differ in the extent to which they provide covered services to the near-poor, as well
as the desperately poor. For example, all states provide coverage to parents who earn no more than
the Federal Poverty Level, which is $16,600 for a family of three in the Lower Forty-Eight states.
Only 14 states have raised their eligibility levels about the Federal Poverty Level. NATIONAL
WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, POOR PARENTS ON MEDICAID TARGETED FOR CUTS 1-2 & 3 n.8 (Feb.
2006), available at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/FSPoorParentsTargeted_06.06.pdf.
369. Some state variation is permitted in what services are covered under the rubric of "family
planning," which includes birth control, treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, and sterilization,
NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, MEDICAID, BIRTH CONTROL AND WOMEN'S HEALTH I & 2 n.2
(Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/FSMedicaidBirthControlandWomens
Health_05.31.06.pdf, thus risking reversal of recent gains in health outcomes for children and their
parents, including the decrease in the rate of teenage pregnancy. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION,
2005 KIDS COUNT POCKET GUIDE 7 (2005), available at
http://www.aecf.org/kidscount/sld/db05_pdfs/entire db.pdf (noting that the teen birth rate has stead-
ily declined since 1991, reaching its lowest level ever, 43 births per 1,000, in 2002). Medicaid
provides two-thirds of all federal and state family planning funding. NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW
CENTER, MEDICAID, BIRTH CONTROL AND WOMEN'S HEALTH, supra at 1.
370. See MEDICAID FACTS, supra note 29, at 1. EPSDT services provide all necessary preven-
tative, diagnostic, and screening care necessary to prevent and treat acute and chronic health condi-
tions, including both physical and mental ailments. Medicaid's goal in insisting that they be pro-
vided is not only to ameliorate individual patient suffering, but also to prevent the development of
more serious health problems, which are both expensive and debilitating. Id.
371. ld. at 2.
372. Id. Some contend that the increased enrollment of Medicaid beneficiaries into managed
care is the source of this failure, id, while others assert that managed care enhances access to health
care services, because Medicaid beneficiaries now have a medical home, rather than being forced to
hunt for a provider willing to accept the historically low Medicaid fees. See Vernon Smith & Linda
Hamacher, The "Good Olde Days" of Fee-for-Service Were Not So Good After All: Managed Care
Has Made Things Better 3, 6-8 (Ass'n of Health Ctr. Affiliated Health Plans, Working Paper, May
2003), available at http://www.ahcahp.org/publications/Working/20Papers/ffs%/20is /20bad.pdf.
373. Suits have been brought in at least 28 states. See GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note
367, at 9; see, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 863 (6th Cit. 2002) (holding that
parents could seek injunctive relief against Michigan and managed care organizations with which
Michigan had contracted to enforce the children's rights to receive EPSDT services); see also Frew
v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) (upholding a federal court consent decree in which Texas health
officials agreed to provide EPSDT services to the more than one million child beneficiaries of the
Texas Medicaid program, many of whom received services via managed care).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
services to which they are entitled. 374 Other barriers to health care access
under Medicaid are discussed below.
The State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was inaugu-
rated in 1997, with the goal of giving states additional options in address-
ing the health care needs of children. In contrast to Medicaid, whose
recipients are entitled to receive all mandated EPSDT services, SCHIP
permits states to offer a less generous package of benefits, with the goal
of reaching a larger group of enrollees.375 SCHIP also authorizes states
to provide services to the low-income parents of eligible children, and
this opportunity for parental enrollment has increased the number of
children who receive health care services.37 6 However, children's health
advocates, notably Sara Rosenbaum, have strongly criticized the SCHIP
program for promising more than it actually delivers in terms of services
to children. 
77
Unlike Medicaid,378 the SCHIP program can be curtailed if states
decide it is too generous or that they cannot afford it.3 79  In the late
1990s, when the economy was strong, many states engaged in significant
outreach activities, and Medicaid and SCHIP enrollments boomed, even
though many eligible children and families were still not enrolled in the
programs. 380 But as the economy faltered in the early twenty-first cen-
tury, many states began to face large budget deficits. They scrambled to
limit enrollment in SCHIP, either by freezing enrollment numbers, in-
creasing procedural obstacles to enrollment, imposing cost-sharing
measures, or limiting outreach activities.381 As a result, SCHIP enroll-
ment has fallen dramatically in many states.382
Further, as a result of the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005,383 federal and state spending on Medicaid will be significantly
curtailed,384 and some Medicaid enrollees will have to spend much more
374. GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 367, at 1-2, 7-8.
375. Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 18-21.
376. KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 9-10.
377. Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 18-21.
378. Medicaid provides states with some flexibility in provision of services through its waiver
procedures, but historically it has been difficult for states to make major cuts in services. However,
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-171, has made significant changes in Medicaid. See
discussion infra in text accompanying notes 384-388. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAID 1-3 (Feb. 2006),
[hereinafter KAISER, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/
7465.pdf.
379. KAISER, ENROLLING CHILDREN, supra note 57, at 2.
380. KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 2,4
381. KAISER, ENROLLING CHILDREN, supra note 57, at 1-2.
382. Id.; see also KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, 1-4.
383. Pub. L. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (signed by President Bush Feb. 8, 2006).
384. The Congressional Budget Office estimates $4.8 billion in reductions over the period
2006 - 2010 and $26.1 billion over the next ten years. See KAISER, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT, supra
note 379, at 1.
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out of pocket for their health care.385 Congress made major changes in
Medicaid, permitting states to charge families with incomes greater than
150% of the federal poverty level ($24,900 for a family of three in 2006)
premiums and cost-sharing (co-pays, etc.) for health care services, al-
though these cost-sharing requirements are not to be applied to pregnant
women and certain eligible children.386 In addition, the law makes it
harder for certain groups of children to receive the preventative EPSDT
services previously mandated.387
3. Insurance Alone is Not the Answer
Two decades of research on Medicaid and SCHIP have shown that
merely making government insurance available is insufficient to ensure
adequate care, for a number of reasons. 388 First, because Medicaid was
originally conceived of as part of the welfare system, it lacks necessary
political support,389 and many health care professionals choose not to
participate because of the very low reimbursement rates.39° Medicaid
recipients often feel stigmatized, and many eligible families are discour-
aged from enrolling. 391 As noted, in some states, the shift of poor chil-
dren and families into Medicaid and SCHIP managed care programs has
created access and service problems which parallel those of middle class
families in managed care,392 with children failing to receive preventative
screenings or other mandated services.393 In other states, however,
Medicaid managed care delivers better health care services to its enrol-
385. Although it appears that the primary impact of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA)
will be to curtail government spending on behalf of elderly and disabled adults, the DRA will also
affect some children and their families. Id. at 1-6.
386. Id. at 1-3.
387. Id. at 3.
388. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32, at 5.
389. John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Medicaid, 340 N. E. J. MED. 403,
407 (1999) (noting that "Medicaid underscores the ambivalence of a society that continually strug-
gles with the question of which citizens deserve access to publicly financed medical care, and under
what conditions").
390. GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 367, at 13-14.
391. Alexandra Marks, Healthcare 'Crisis' Grows for Middle Class, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Apr. 3, 2002, at USA 3; Lauren Terrazzano, More Kids Uninsured; L.I. Is One of the
Nation's Richest Areas But Its Children Are Insurance-Poor in Greater Numbers, NEWSDAY, Aug.
20, 2005, at A08.
392. Some access problems are inevitable in a system which provides disincentives to treat.
See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (describing the incentives inherent in both managed
care and fee-for-service medicine). For a fuller discussion of the problems of managed care, see
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN, & TROYEN A. BRENNAN, HEALTH CARE LAW AND
POLICY 1180-1298 (2d ed. 1998). Of course, one should be cautious in bashing managed care, since
the fee-for-service health care system also has undesirable incentives, particularly to over-treat,
which can be equally bad for patient well-being. Id. at 160-83.
393. GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 367, at 9-10, 12-13. For example, only 19% of
Medicaid enrolled children five and under had been screened for lead poisoning, even though this
group of children is "almost five times more likely than others to have a harmful blood lead level."
Id. at 12. Only a fifth of eligible children aged two to five had visited a dentist within the previous
year. Id.
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lees than the traditional fee-for-service model.394 In any case, since
Medicaid and SCHIP enrollees are frequently less well-educated, lack
child care and convenient transportation, and are not native English
speakers, it may be difficult for them to receive all of the care to which
they are entitled.395
Further, either by design or inadvertence, Medicaid and SCHIP
have substantial barriers to enrollment and utilization. These include
complex eligibility rules (including in many states, denial of eligibility if
the parents have even limited assets), cumbersome forms to fill out at
inconvenient locations, and requirements of frequent reenrollment, as
often as every six months.396 SCHIP permits enrollees to be charged
premiums or co-payments.397 This can be a significant burden for low-
income families enrolled in SCHIP. 398 Although it is necessary to ensure
that enrollees meet the statutory means tests, and to acknowledge the
possibility of "crowd-out" (the phenomenon by which consumers shift
from privately funded health insurance to public programs),399 if con-
cerns about fraud or crowd-out become a major focus, many children
will not have access to health care.400
4. Inadequate Substance Abuse Programs
The resources presently available to treat women who abuse alcohol
and other drugs are woefully inadequate. There are three major problems
with most substance abuse programs: 1) they fail to recognize the sig-
nificant relationship between domestic violence and women's mental
illness and substance abuse;401 2) they do not take into account the differ-
ing treatment needs of men and women;402 and 3) they do not provide the
complementary support necessary for pregnant women and mothers to
succeed in beating their addiction.40 3 Only 14% of the drug treatment
394. See, e.g., Patrick J. Roohan et al., Quality Measurement in Medicaid Managed Care and
Fee-for-Service, the New York State Experience, 21 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 185 (2006); Smith &
Hamacher, supra note 372.
395. GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 367, at 14.
396. KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 4-10 (summarizing recent
changes made by states in Medicaid and SCHIP and their impact on enrollment).
397. Id. at 7, 13.
398. Id. at 6-8.
399. Id. at 14-15. For a general discussion of the crowd-out phenomenon, see John V. Jacobi,
Government Reinsurance Programs and Consumer-Driven Care, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 537, 571-73
(2005).
400. See URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356.
401. Only 35% of drug treatment facilities in the United States have programs for persons
needing treatment for both substance abuse and mental illness. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES (N-SSATS): 2003, DATA ON
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facilities in the United States have programs specifically designed to treat
pregnant and postpartum women.
Many women who abuse alcohol and other drugs were sexually
abused or beaten as children and have significant mental health and self-
esteem issues, which make it much more likely that they will misuse
drugs.4 °5 Without acknowledgement of the causal connections between
domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental illness and active inter-
vention to prevent current domestic violence from continuing, women
will not receive the support necessary to recover from addiction and
mental illness.40 6 Those who work in the government agencies that deal
with domestic violence victims, including police, hospital staff, and so-
cial workers need more training in understanding the broad context of
domestic violence, in order for their interventions to be appropriate and
effective.40 7
Many drug treatment programs are not designed with the needs of
women in mind. For example, traditional confrontational approaches,
effective with male drug addicts, do not work well with women,40 8 and
women also have better treatment outcomes in programs that are for
women only.409 For women who are long-term abusers, residential pro-
grams are most effective, 410 but these programs must take into account
the needs of women with children.411 Child care, housing, health care,
job training, and other vital supports are necessary if women are to stay
"clean" and become self-sufficient.412 Further, the Adoption and Safe
Families Act should be amended to provide an exemption from its strict
time limits, to acknowledge that addiction recovery does not fit neatly
into the statutory timetable.413 Finally, more programs must emphasize
prevention, to treat addicted women before they become pregnant.414
5. The Consequences of America's Inadequate Health Care System
Research over the last several decades has made clear the conse-
quences of inadequate health care for America's women and children.
Both maternal and infant mortality are higher in the United States than in
404. Id.
405. Paltrow, supra note 12, at 477; WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12, at 1.
406. WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12, at 3.
407. Id.
408. SANDRA L. BLOOM, THE PVS DISASTER: POVERTY, VIOLENCE, AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE
IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 165 (2002).
409. Id. at 164; WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12, at 5, 23.
410. BLOOM, supra note 408, at 108 (citing M. Daley et al., The Impact of Substance Abuse
Treatment Modality on Birth Weight and Health Care Expenditures, 33 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS
57-66 (2001)).
411. BLOOM, supra note 408, at 164.
412. Id. (citing NAT'L INST. OF DRUG ADDICTION, TREATMENT METHODS FOR WOMEN 13652
(1999)).
413. See generally Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies, supra note 9.
414. See generally WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12.
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many other nations.415 American children are more likely to be bom pre-
term and at low or very low birthweight,416 and are less likely to have
preventative doctors' visits, obtain necessary immunizations, and access
necessary reproductive and mental health care.417 Study after study has
shown that a focus on pregnant women as a vehicle for ensuring healthy
children is too little, too late. Instead, comprehensive solutions, which
address the systemic failure to take care of America's children, must be
developed.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
If we are to truly assist children to become healthy adults who are
able to embrace life's opportunities, we must explore new ways of think-
ing about the health of children and the women who bear and raise them.
There are six areas where change is crucial: ending poverty, providing
universal health care, expanding substance abuse prevention and treat-
ment programs, enhancing environmental and workplace protections,
instituting no-fault compensation for children who are harmed in utero,
and ending criminal and civil actions against pregnant women who may
be placing their fetuses at risk.
End Poverty
Even making this recommendation seems both naive and incredibly
ambitious; yet it is an inescapable fact that being poor has serious ad-
verse consequences for children's health and development. Children
living in poverty (who are also more likely to be malnourished and
homeless) have more learning disabilities and mental retardation, lower
IQs, and higher rates of mental illness, behavioral problems, and greater
physical health problems, than middle-income children. 418 The effects of
childhood poverty continue through adulthood, perpetuating the cyclical
connection between inadequate parental income and childhood disease
and dysfunction.41 9 With twelve million American children living in
families with incomes less than the federal poverty level (and five mil-
415. See supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
416. IOM Report, supra note 55.
417. KAISER, ENROLLING CHILDREN, supra note 57, at 1; GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra
note 367, at 9, 12-13.
418. Charles Oberg, Maternal & Child Health Program, School of Public Health, University of
Minnesota, The Impact of Childhood Poverty on Health and Development, HEALTHY GENERATIONS,
May 2003, at 2 & 3 nn.7-10; See also Jane D. McLeod & Michael J. Shanahan, Trajectories of
Poverty and Children's Mental Health, 37 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 207, 207 (1996).
419. Anne Case, Darren Lubotsky & Christina Paxson, Economic Status and Health in Child-
hood: The Origins of the Gradient, 92 AM. ECON. REVIEW 1308, 1308-09 (2002). Studies indicate
that malnutrition in utero has significant life-time consequences, which actually are more pro-
nounced as people age. See Gina Kolata, So Big and Healthy Nowadays, Grandpa Wouldn't Know
You, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at Al.
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lion of those children living on less than half that amount),42 ° interven-
tion is critical.
Provide Universal Health Care
Universal health care coverage is essential if we are to provide chil-
dren with the health care services necessary for them to grow, learn, and
develop into healthy and productive adults, who in turn will have healthy
children of their own. While there are many historical and philosophical
reasons for America's reliance on the market to provide health care for
its citizens,42' we can no longer afford to ignore the health care needs of
the one-sixth of the population who lack health insurance of any kind.422
Estimates of the cost of providing health care coverage for all Americans
range from thirty-three to sixty-nine billion dollars annually, 423 poten-
tially less than the amount the American government currently spends on
424the war in Iraq. While several states have recently enacted laws ex-
panding health care coverage 425 a comprehensive solution requires a fed-
eral effort.
At the very least, a uniform federal health care program for children
with a comprehensive set of benefits and services should be estab-
lished.426 This would avoid the cyclical contractions and expansions of
state Medicaid and SCHIP programs which presently accompany eco-
nomic upswings and downturns and make it difficult for states to pay for
420. NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHILDHOOD POVERTY, MAILMAN SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, WHO ARE AMERICA'S POOR CHILDREN 1, available at
http://www.nccp.org/pubcptO5b.html.
421. See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Why Can't We Do What They Do? National Health Reform
Abroad, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 433 (2004).
422. URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356 (finding that 46.6 million Americans did not have
insurance in 2005). As a practical matter, the uninsured do receive some health care through emer-
gency room visits. Such care is expensive and often time-consuming. It is estimated that one-third
of the care provided at hospital emergency departments is inappropriate. Ceci Connolly, Some
Finding No Room at the ER; Screening Out Non-Urgent Cases Stirs Controversy, WASH. POST, Apr.
26, 2004, at AO1. The high costs of providing emergency room care required under EMTALA, the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, and state anti-dumping laws are borne by
hospitals and ultimately, the tax-payer. See Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (N.Y 2001)
(discussing the problem of immigrants who are denied care until their medical situation becomes an
emergency).
423. URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356. These estimates appear to be in 2004 dollars. If it is
not possible to establish health care for the entire population immediately, then, at a minimum, full
coverage for children's health care should be established now, before the mass of Baby Boomers age
into retirement, Medicare, and the need for long-term care.
424. In February, 2006, the Department of Defense stated that it was spending $4.5 billion a
month (or $54 billion a year) on the Iraq war. Mark Mazetti & Joel Haveman, Iraq War is Costing
$100,000 per Minute, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006; Mark Silva, $70 Billion Sought for War Costs;
White House Says Another $50 Billion Needed for 2007, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2006, at C1.
425. The most notable are the Massachusetts Health Care Access and Affordability Act, ch.. 58
(2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sI060058.htm, and the Maryland Fair
Share Health Care Fund Act, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-101 et. seq, partially invalidated
by Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D. Md. 2006) (finding the act pre-
empted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
426. The Medicaid EPSDT program should be seen as a floor, not a ceiling. See Rosenbaum,
Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 43; see also supra text accompanying notes 370-401.
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adequate health care in times of fiscal exigency.427 With national univer-
sal coverage, children will not lose access to vital health services because
their parents move or change jobs, fail to fill out cumbersome paper-
work, earn slightly more or less income, or are unable to afford premi-
ums and co-payments. 2 s Further, boys and girls who receive good
health care will become adults who are more likely to bear healthy chil-
dren.
Ultimately, however, if we want to meet the goal of having more
American children in good health, it will be necessary to provide health
care for all adults as well. Issues of nutrition, infertility, sterility, sexu-
ally transmitted diseases, and reproductive problems must be addressed
in the adult population if we are to achieve better birth outcomes.
Provide Expanded and Targeted Substance Abuse Programs for Preg-
nant Women and Addicts Who Are Likely to Become Pregnant
As noted above, substance abuse education and treatment programs
must be expanded and improved in order to serve both addicted women
and the children they bear. Treatment which takes into account the spe-
cial needs of women with drug and alcohol problems has been shown to
be effective and to save money over the long run.
429
Improve Environmental, Workplace, and Public Health Protections
At the same time, medical treatment alone is insufficient to ensure
children's health. Environmental, workplace, and other public health
laws must be strengthened to protect children from exposure to toxic
substances, whether exposure is in utero or after birth. In addition, the
government should mandate paid parental leave so that parents will be
able to care for their children when they are infants or ill.
Establish a No-Fault Program to Compensate Children Who Suffer Pre-
natal Harm
One way that the government can respect the autonomy of pregnant
women, compensate children who are harmed due to prenatal injury or
exposure to toxic substances, and respond to the fears of employers and
others about tort liability is to establish a national prenatal injury com-
pensation program. Such a program could be funded by modest contri-
butions by employers and manufacturers of toxic substances, including
alcohol. Such a program could be modeled on the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury (NCVI) program, 430 enacted in 1986 to encourage vac-
427. Smith & Hamacher, supra note 372, at 12-13.
428. See generally KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160.
429. BLOOM, supra note 408, at 163-75.
430. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-33, created a
program to provide compensation children injured by state-mandated vaccines, as a means of ensur-
ing that children who suffer injury from vaccination will be compensated, that parents will be en-
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cine manufacturers to continue producing vaccines for childhood dis-
eases while simultaneously compensating the small number of children
who were injured as a result of vaccination, and thus reassure parents
who might otherwise decide not to vaccinate their children. The NCVI
has proved extraordinarily successful in meeting all three of its goals,
and has been touted as a model for other tort-based consumer protection
problems.431
The program I propose acknowledges that women, men, and chil-
dren face risks from the food and drink they consume, the environment,
and the workplace, and that manufacturers of dangerous substances
should be held responsible for the harm caused by in utero exposure,
even when they try to minimize those risks. Children who suffer harm
from an otherwise socially desired or valued product must be compen-
sated, just as they are under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Pro-
gram. The proposed program would involve a compromise, limiting
liability of manufacturers and employers in exchange for guaranteeing
compensation to prenatally injured children. These trade-offs are supe-
rior to the current approach of excluding women from the workplace or
otherwise penalizing women for their conduct during pregnancy. Manu-
facturers would have an incentive to minimize the exposure to the toxic
substances they use and produce, whether it is lead used to make batter-
ies, mercury and other environmental contaminants, nicotine and tar in
cigarettes, or alcohol in wine, beer, and liquor.432 Even sellers and dis-
tributors of illegal drugs could be made to contribute to the PIC fund, by
requiring monetary victim restitution as part of their criminal sen-
tences.433
courage to vaccinate their children, and that manufacturers will not be discouraged from entering
and participating in the vaccine market because of fears of liability for products that are "unavoid-
ably unsafe." Theodore H. Davis, Jr. & Catherine B. Bowman, No-Fault Compensation for Un-
avoidable Injuries: Evaluating the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 16
U. DAYTON L. REv. 277, 279 (1991).
431. Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance, Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAw 59, 76-88 (1999); Geoffrey Evans, Up-
date on Vaccine Liability in the United States: Presentation at the National Vaccine Program Office
Workshop on Strengthening the Supply of Routinely Recommended Vaccines in the United States, 12
February 2002, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S130-S137 (Mar. 1, 2006), abstract available at
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi: 10. 1086/499592&erFrom=7871817745
69628204IGuest. Under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, manufacturers pay a
tax of $0.75 per dose of vaccine administered. Ridgway, supra at 62, http://content.nejm.org/
cgi/reprint/340/5/403.pdf.
432. Thus, for example, alcohol manufacturers and distributors would have an economic incen-
tive to make warning labels about the effects of alcohol during pregnancy clearer, more conspicuous,
and more explicit. Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Alcohol Warning Labels
Go Unnoticed, Poll Finds (Aug. 20, 200), available at http://www.cspinet.org/booze/batf
labels2001 _press.htm.
433. Cf U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5ElI, 8B1.1 (2005), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/5el_l.htm and http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/8bl_l.htm (requiring
individual and organizational defendants to pay restitution to their victims).
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End Civil Commitment and Involuntary Medical Treatment of Pregnant
Women
The involuntary restraint and compulsory medical treatment of
pregnant women is counterproductive, deterring women from seeking
medical and psychological help. Physicians and hospitals are fallible.
They do a profound disservice to those whom they wish to help when
they rely on court orders rather than trying to advise and persuade preg-
nant patients about what is in their (and their fetuses') best interest.
There is substantial evidence that health care providers are relying on
racial and class stereotypes when they decide when to seek judicial inter-
vention.434 Similarly, there is no reason for legislatures to disable
women from exercising the right to self-determination when pregnant, by
rendering their advance medical directives invalid.
End Civil and Criminal Liability of Pregnant Women for Causing
Prenatal Harm
The thesis of this article is that holding women civilly or criminally
liable for their actions while pregnant is bad public policy. Imposing
criminal or civil liability deters women from seeking medical care, in-
cluding treatment for drug and alcohol addiction, leading to worse, rather
than better, birth outcomes, and raises significant normative questions
about who is the reasonable pregnant woman.43 Some American
courts, 436 as well as those in other countries, 437 have acknowledged that
there is no way to prescribe the standard of appropriate behavior while
pregnant with any certainty, that making a judgment about recklessness
or negligence is inevitably subjective, and thus is freighted with the pos-
sibility of prejudice and bias. Further, most efforts at criminal prosecu-
tion or civil commitment have focused on poor women and women of
color, 438 despite evidence that drug usage during pregnancy is equivalent
across racial and economic lines, with the only difference being that
white and middle-class women tend to use alcohol, a legal drug, rather
than cocaine.439
Attacking pregnant women provides a simplistic solution to a com-
plex problem. Courts and legislatures should avoid this meretricious
solution, recognizing the unique relationship between pregnant woman
434. See generally Chasnoff, supra note 10; Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, supra
note 9.
435. Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 477-78 (Tex. App. 1999).
436. Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 477-78; Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (111.
1988); Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 310-15 (Md. 2006).
437. Dobson v. Dobson, 2 S.C.R. 753 (Can. 1999); Winnipeg Child & Family Services
(Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), 3 S.C.R. 925 (Can. 1997); Paton v. United Kingdom, App. No.
8416/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 408, 415 (1980).
438. BLOOM, supra note 408, at 109; Chasnoff, supra note 10; Roberts, Unshackling Black
Motherhood, supra note 9.
439. BLOOM, supra note 408, at 109-10.
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and the fetus. 440 Government policymakers should acknowledge that the
vast majority of pregnant women want only the best for the fetus whom
they are nourishing, and that in almost all cases women who are not act-
ing in the best interests of their fetus are facing heavy burdens of pov-
erty, addiction, lack of access to quality health care, and domestic abuse.
The way to help such women, and the children they will bear, is to
change the system in which they are now struggling, not to make preg-
nant women the scapegoat for that system's failures.
440. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
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